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Foreign investment has become increasingly important in
shaping the international economic landscape, and this explains the
growing significance of the international law and policy of foreign
investment in the world.1 There is a huge number of investment
agreements, including both (bilateral) investment treaties ("BITs")
and free trade agreements ("FTAs") that have investment chapters)
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World Congress on International Law hosted by the Indian Society of International Law.
Special thanks are owed to Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Fernando Dias Simoes, Michael
Lang, Jeffrey Owens, and Jan Wouters. I am also grateful to the editors and staff at the
Hastings Business Law Journalfor their hard work and skillful editing. All opinions expressed
here and any errors are mine.
1. See Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competing for Capital
The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2009, 60 INT'L ORG. 811, 843 (2006)
(concluding, tentatively, that countries with histories of poor governance may be driven to sign
BITs by the need to compete for FDI with countries capable of providing more credible
domestic investment protection). In this respect, the tribunal in AIG v. Kazakhstan found that
treaties (whether bilateral or multilateral) are an acknowledged source of international law and
are often referred to as "law-making treaties" and the BIT itself establishes a rule of law as
between the parties thereto. AIG Capital Partners, Inc. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/6, Award, 10.1.210.1.3 (Oct. 7,2003).
2. See Mary E. Footer, BITs and Pieces: Social and Environmental Protection in the
Regulation of Foreign Investment, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 33, 36-39 (2009) (describing how
investment treaties have developed towards promoting and protecting foreign investment); M.
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Although these international investment agreements ("IIAs")3 are
concluded between States as part of public international law,4 they
are designed to provide rights to foreign investors who are, in an
overwhelming majority, foreign private investors.5 In particular,
these investment agreements grant a right to foreign private investors
SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 207 (2d ed. 2004) (stating
that one feature of the IIAs "is that thev are made between unequal partners," which
demonstrates this dichotomy in the context of ICSID and IIA since it relates to the relationship
between strong, capital-exporter states that may use power diplomacy to force weaker, capital-
importer states to settle in unequal terms) (citation omitted). See also ICSID DATABASE OF
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/
resources/Pages/Bilateral-Investment-Treaties-Database.bak.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2015)
(presenting an organized database of BITs listed by country).
3. I use the terms "BITs" and "bilateral investment agreements" in reference to
international instruments specifically devoted to the promotion and protection of foreign
investment-such as "Bilateral Investment Treaties," "Foreign Investment Promotion
Agreements," and "Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements." I refer as "free trade
agreements" (-FTAs") all bilateral, regional, or plurilateral arrangements that seek the
preferential liberalization of investment flows, along with trade in goods and in services, and
often provide rules on other areas, such as intellectual property, competition, and movement of
natural persons. Both BITs and FTAs with investment disciplines are encompassed under the
broader terms of "international investment agreements" ("IAs").
4. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 536-37 (2d ed. 2008)
("By the early 1960s, following the wave of decolonization in Africa and parts of Asia, and a
wave of take-overs of foreign investments throughout the Third World, it had become apparent
that it would be very difficult to achieve consensus on the obligations of host countries toward
alien investment (read multinational corporations). The leading international aid institution,
the World Bank, began to consider how, on the one hand, it could avoid becoming embroiled in
controversies between home and host states concerning expropriation, and on the other hand,
how it could assist the resolution of such controversies."). See also Jeswald W. Salacuse, The
Emerying Global Repime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 427, 436-37 (2010) (-[T]he
existing international law at the end of World War II-what one might call the 'ancien
regime'-failed to adequately protect the foreign investments of their [capital-exporting]
nationals from injurious actions by host country government .... The need for such protection
was heightened by the prospect of post-War economic expansion and the decolonization of
territories that had previously been under the control of capital-exporting states.").
5. In this respect, the tribunal in Lemire v. Ukraine Award found that foreign investors
covered by a BIT enjoy an additional level of protection: they can avail themselves of the same
instruments open to local investors, and additionally they can draw protection from the
international law rights conferred by the treaty; the different treatment between foreign and
domestic investors is a natural consequence of a BIT; however, this unequal treatment is not
without justification: justice is not to grant everyone the same, but suum cuique tribuere and
foreigners, who lack political rights, are more exposed than domestic investors to arbitrary
actions of the host State and may thus, as a matter of legitimate policy, be granted a wider scope
of protection. Joseph C. Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Award, 28, 57 (Mar.
5, 2011).
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to file a claim against host states before international arbitration
tribunals.6
In recent years, the development of the international law of
foreign investment has been criticized for giving too much power to
foreign investors,7 while many have criticized international arbitration
for not being able to develop a jurisprudence constante.' Despite
these critiques, the current regime seems to work well and provide
adequate protection to most foreign investors. In this respect, a new
practice is emerging with "treaty shopping," which is a new test for
the current regime and the ongoing negotiations in the context of the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership ("TTIP") or the
trans-pacific partnership ("TPP"). 9
6. See Melmet Toral & Thomas Schultz, The State, a Perpetual Respondent in Investment
Arbitration? Some Unorthodox Considerations, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 577 (Claire Balchin et al. eds., 2010); Gustavo
Laborde, The Case for Host State Claims in Investment Arbitration, I J. INT'L DISP.
SETTLEMENT 97, 97-1(P- (2010). On the emerging issue of sovereign debt restructure by
international Tribunals, see Julien Chaisse, The Impact of International Investment Agreements
on the Greek Default, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AFTER THE GLOBAL CRISIS-A
TALE OF FRAGMENTED DISCIPLINE 535-72 (Chin Leng Lim & Bryan Mercurio eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2015).
7. See Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Laws Legitimaci:
Conceptual and Mlethodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT'L L.
57, 63-67 (2011) (describing why BITs have proven controversial). See also Dr. Uche
Ewelukwa Ofodile, Africa-China BilateralIn vestment Treaties. A Critique, 35 MICH. J. INT'L L.
131, 147 (2013) (describing how BITs give out-of-state investors greater rights in relation to in-
state investors that could affect or limit the regulatory authority of a state).
8. See Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the
Legitimaci of International Investment La ii?, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 471 (2009) (positing that,
although inconsistency is currently a problem, the passage of time will lead to more uniform
results); Susan D. Franck, The Leigitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizin
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005)
(proposing the creation of a permanent appellate body, enhanced transparency, and increased
academic scrutiny in order to combat inconsistency); Jacques Werner, Aaking Investment
Arbitration Alore Certain: A Alodest Proposal, 4 J. WORLD INVESTMENT 767 (2003) (endorsing
an appellate level of review for investment arbitration decisions and arguing that arbitrators
should play an active role in consolidating proceedings or staying decisions where other arbitral
panels have already issued an award). See also Martins Paparinskis, Investment Treaty
Arbitration and the (Ne i) Law of State Responsibiliti, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 617, 626 (2013)
(arguing that the choice between direct rights and agency approaches is a matter of treaty
interpretation).
9. The Trans-Pacific Partnership talks are aimed at enhancing trade and investment
among the partner countries; promoting innovation, economic growth and development; and
supporting the creation and retention of jobs. The U.S. in the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Nov. 2011), available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/united-states-trans-pacific-partnership. See also
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There is no official definition of treaty shopping. Also, as a
matter of law, treaty shopping is not, in principle, prohibited under
international investment law, as the precise purpose of IIAs is to
encourage investment. In light of the corporate practice, one can
formulate a definition describing treaty shopping as the process of
routing an investment so as to gain access to an IIA where one did
not previously exist or to gain access to more favorable IIA
protection. In addition, treaty shopping can further be narrowed by
introducing a temporal element and by focusing the definition on
restructuring by the transfer of shares or otherwise at the time when
the investment is already under some threat, such as in the case of
revocation of a license or termination of a contract. In essence, treaty
shopping refers to the practice of structuring (and restructuring)
investments to gain access to international jurisdiction. 0
I do not argue that the relevance of corporate nationality has
disappeared; as a matter of fact, a number of international awards
discuss this legal requirement.1 Certainly, it has become so easy for
foreign investors to relocate to different jurisdictions that the
contents of nationality have largely lost their essence. This article
analyzes the magnitude of the treaty shopping practice and draws
relevant theoretical and policy implications for proper rule-making.
This fills the gap in the literature, as it is based on a comprehensive
survey of tribunal awards to assess the real prevalence of treaty
shopping. Also, observing that in all systems of law, whether
domestic or international, there are concepts framed in order to avoid
TPP. What Is It and WhY Does It Mlatter?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21782080.
10. See Gabriel Bottini, Protection of Essential Interests in the BIT Era, in INVESTMENT
TREATY ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 145 (TJ Grierson Weiler ed., 2008).
11. See, e.g., Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v. U.A.E., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7, Award,
45-46 (July 7, 2004), IIC 131 (2004) (finding that the claimant was not an Italian national at the
relevant times and therefore not covered by the treaty); Champion Trading Co. v. Egypt, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/9, Decision on Jurisdiction, 288 (Oct. 21, 2003), IIC 56 (2003) (finding that
individual claimants were dual United States and Egyptian nationals and therefore could not
bring claims against Egypt under the treaty); but see, e.., Waguih Elie George Siag v. Arab
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, 200-01 (Apr. 11,
2007), IIC 288 (finding that the claimants had Italian nationality at the relevant times); loan
Micula v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
104-06 (Sept. 24, 2008), IIC 339 (finding that the individual claimants had acquired Swedish
nationality).
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misuse of the law; reference may be made in this respect to "good
faith" ("bonne foi"), "ddtournement de pouvoir" (misuse of power)
or "abus de droit" (abuse of right),' - this Article seeks to identify the
legal principles used by international tribunals to address the issue of
treaty shopping. On this basis, this article more specifically discusses
three critical issues. First, whether treaty shopping is good or bad
from various angles (from both the state and investor perspectives).
Second, what is the implication of having a different type of
investment treaty (non-harmonized investment treaties), given that
the treaty shopping problem exists'? Third, how to mitigate the
negative aspects of the treaty shopping problem'? What type of
provisions and clauses are necessary to prevent treaty shopping or to
reduce the negative side of treaty shopping?
13
The article presents in Part II the recent evolution of
international investment law and identifies the legal determinants of
treaty shopping. Part III goes on to review the practice and reality of
treaty shopping. Subsequently, Part IV provides a mapping of the
cause of treaty shopping. Part V then presents an account of existing
provisions designed to control treaty shopping. Finally, policy
conclusions are drawn in the conclusion.
12. On these principles, see the wonderful discussion in Venezuela Holdings B.V. v.
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, 169-85, Decision on
Jurisdiction (June 10, 2010).
13. Professor Leon E. Trakman writes that the "investor treaty-shopping for intermediary
states is not risk free. In particular, an ISA claim brought through an intermediary state, as a
forum of convenience, may fail on the jurisdictional ground that the claimant's legal connection
to the intermediary state is insufficiently substantial to lodge a claim from that state. That risk is
conceivably accentuated as more states strive for intermediary status, seeking to provide
investors with ever readier means of establishing legal connections to investor targeted states.
Coupled with these developments is the likelihood of regulators, including ISA tribunals,
establishing rules to regulate investor treaty-shopping, which intermediary states will
undoubtedly follow by promulgating countervailing measures designed to circumvent those
regulations." Leon E. Trakman, Investment Dispute Resolution under the Transpacific
Partnership Agreement Prelude to a Slippery Slope?, 5 GEO. MASON J. INT'L COM. L. 1, 29
(2013).
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II. IDENTIFYING THE SEEDS OF TREATY SHOPPING:
EXPANSION OF IIAS
Corporate structuring and restructuring to gain access to
investment treaties and arbitration is a new phenomenon because
IlAs are a type of legal instrument. Until recently, foreign direct
investments ("FDIs") were perceived to be exclusively governed by
national rules and principles. It was only in the early 1980s that a
great change in attitude vis-i-vis foreign investment was shown in
almost all countries. 14 The international legal framework for foreign
investment includes rules of general international law, bilateral,
regional, 5 and multilateral agreements, 6 as well as texts without
14. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief Historr of International Investment Agreements,
12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POLY 157, 160-61 (2005). While the first investment treaty was
signed in 1959 (Germany-Pakistan BIT), the first one to include an unqualified consent to
investor-state arbitration came a decade later in 1969 (Chad-Italy BIT). See ANDREW
NEWCOMBE & Luis PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS
OF TREATMENT 42, 45 (2009). Until the late 1980s or early 1990s, most investment treaties did
not contain strong preconsents to investor-state arbitration over a wide range of issues. See
Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Stud of Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 405, 423-33 (2008).
15. At the regional level, the liberalization movements find themselves in instruments
reflecting economic integration efforts, with varying degrees of intensity and success. In this
area, a significant case is that the amendments made in 1991 to instruments related to FDI and
technology transfer from the Andean Pact countries, which replaced the previous more
restrictive regulations. In the same vein, we must mention the provisions in the agreements
made after 1989 between the European Community and the countries of Central Europe, as
well as those of the successive Lome Conventions between the European Community and a
broad group of countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. Beyond the regional
integration efforts, similar processes have been started. Investment Principles 1994 for
Economic Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific countries ("APEC") and the Charter of the Pacific
basin on international investments also reflect, in an explicit way, the dominant trends. See
Histori; APEC, http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/History.aspx (for a history of the
APEC). In October 1998, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN")
signed the Agreement for investments in the ASEAN region, in order to create a more liberal
and transparent investment environment area. In other regions, efforts continued in the same
directions. See GILBERT R. WINHAM, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS 52-56 (1992); ASEAN Mlember States, ASEAN, http://www.asean.org/
asean/asean-member-states (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (ASEAN includes many of the TTP
participants).
16. At the multilateral level, the Guide to the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment
1992, prepared as part of the World Bank, appears to be of particular importance.
Theoretically, the normative scope of this instrument is limited, but, according to some authors,
it is a substitute for the large multilateral convention whose development has not yet been
reached. Other multilateral instruments expressing new trends were discussed, the most
important of which are the agreements negotiated in the Uruguay Round, 1994, although
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binding force. Currently, the core legal basis for investment mainly
consists of treaties between states on this matter.17 The role of
international rules for foreign investment has expanded considerably,
and they remain under constant pressure to expand even more. 8 So,
there are three levels of international investment regulations; these
are national (domestic) regulation, IIAs (such as BITs and chapters
on investment in preferred trade agreements ("PTAs")), and
multilateral rules applicable to the subject of investment. Generally,
national regulation seeks to capture the benefits and address some of
the potential costs of FDJ, whereas international rules are generally
designed to provide protection to investors with a view to ensure that
they are not subject to unfair and unpredictable treatment by host
states, and, in some cases, to provide access to host country markets.
In recent years, the considerable expansion of IIAs has strengthened
their decisive role in national investment policies. As a result,
corporations are looking for these legal guaranties, and treaty
shopping can proliferate. Section A explains the significance of
investment treaties. Section B discusses the scope of application of
these treaties.
sometimes they do not mention those parts which involve or affect investment. These are the
General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"), the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"), and the Agreement on Trade Related Investment
Measures ("TRIMS"). These trends were reflected in texts characterless mandatory. See
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183. For a commentary,
see Laurel S. Terry, From GATS to APEC. The Impact of Trade Agreements on Legal
Services, 43 AKRON L. REV. 875, 961, 971, 981 (2010).
17. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Treatification of International Investment La if, 13 L. &
Bus. REV. AM. 155 (2007). This "treatification" shows the significant recalibration of
international investment law over the last years. See also United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development ("UNCTAD"), New York, U.S. and Geneva, Switz., 2014, Rorld Investment
Report 2014, annex tbl. II1 (2012) (listing IhAs as of mid-June 2014) (IIAs have been
expanding considerably over the last decade, amounting by the beginning of 2013 to more than
2,800 BITs, whereas fewer than four hundred BITs existed at the end of the 1990s).
18. Efraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral In vestment Treaties: A De facto Mlultilateral
Agreement?, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 303, 307 (2009). See -enerally ANDREW NEWCOMBE &
LuIs PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF
TREATMENT 41-46 (2009); RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 17-20 (2008); KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND INTERPRETATION 49-59 (2010).
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A. SIGNIFICANCE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MULTI-
LAYERED REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Host countries develop the first level of international investment
regulation by promulgating national (domestic) rules in order to
ensure that the potential benefits of FDI are realized and the
potential costs are avoided. To attract FDI, host states generally
combine openness with incentives for investors. This may be because
many countries in the world are competing to seek the same
investment. 19
All these incentives are directed to achieve a common goal of
making a host state attractive for investors to invest. 0  Although
investment has benefits, there may also be disadvantages attached to
it, leading to a variety of concerns for the host country. In their
national regulation, host states try to respond to such concerns. 1
In addition, FDI could have negative spillover effects such as
environmental degradation, violation of labor and human rights,
limited technology transfer on the pretext of lack of absorption
capacity, displacement of labor from domestic industries leading to
employment loss, anticompetitive acts, like abuse of dominant
position by foreign investors, and transfer pricing that unfairly
reduces the taxes paid to the host country.--
19. These incentives are comparable to Free Zones, in which duty-free imports and exports
are permitted, together with direct subsidies and other financial incentives, and foreign
investment guarantees (e.g., promises to stabilize domestic laws, provide tax relief, and allow
currency conversion, and the repatriation of sale proceeds and profits). In the 1980s, the SEZs
were created in Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province and Xiamen
Municipality in Fujian "to attract foreign investment from Hong Kong, Macao and overseas
Chinese, to introduce advanced technology from abroad, to generate foreign exchange to aid
China's overall foreign exchange position, to pioneer in China's economic reform, and lastly, to
show the determination of the Chinese government in transforming its economic and social
structures." CHENG YUAN, FAST-WEST TRADE: CHANGING PATTERNS IN CHINESE FOREIGN
TRADE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 78 (1991).
20. See Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The
DualRole of States, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 179, 179-84 (2010).
21. These concerns could be summarized as concerns about the effect of FDI on national
security and defense, sovereignty, and the balance of payments, including potentially large
future remittances by investors, a possibly high import content of FDI projects, protection of
domestic industry, control over national resources and noneconomic issues such as the
protection of local culture. See, e.., Benjamin J. Cohen, Sovereign Wealth Funds and National
Securiti: The Great Tradeoff 85 INT'L AFT. 713 (2009).
22. See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Rork: An Evaluation
Vol. 11:2
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In order to pursue the goal of attracting FDI and simultaneously
addressing these fears, a variety of approaches can be found in
national regimes dealing with foreign investment. 23 International
investment law provides rules to ensure access for foreign investment
to host country markets and to protect investment against risk
(especially political risk). It creates a specific set of investment
protection obligations on host countries, including protection against
expropriation without compensation and also gives access to financial
compensation through investor-state arbitration where the host
country breaches a protection obligation. Unfortunately, at present,
we do not have any comprehensive multilateral agreement on
investment either under the ambit of the World Trade Organization
("WTO") or anywhere else. 4  Hence, international rules on
investment are fragmented and there is a wide variety of obligations.25
The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
("TRIMS") does refer to investment, but it is a very limited
agreement, dealing only with investment rules that have an impact on
trade in goods that is contrary to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT").26 The WTO General Agreement on Trade in
of BilateralIn vestment Treaties and Their GrandBarigain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67,89 (2005).
23. See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Mleasures
Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 307, 349 (2008). For example,
policy instruments may limit foreign ownership in specific sectors, subject foreign investments to
mandatory approval requirements, or introduce performance requirements like permitting
foreign investors to invest only if (i) they enter into a joint venture with a local firm to invest,
(ii) they buy their inputs locally in the host country (local sourcing requirements), (iii) they limit
their imports to the value of their exports (trade balancing), (iv) they meet export performance
requirements, (v) they produce certain products (product mandating), or (vi) they engage in
technology transfer. Other measures include restrictions on land ownership, the repatriation of
investment, or the conversion of currency. The host country, while introducing these policy
instruments, needs to be aware of the fact that at the end of the day the market needs to still
look attractive if it is going to attract FDI.
24. Under the WTO's Doha Development Agenda, the possibility of negotiations on
investment was originally included in 2001 but it was dropped in 2004. There was a prior
attempt to negotiate a Multilateral Investment Agreement ("MIA") between OECD countries
as a plurilateral agreement, but these negotiations ended without success in 1997. See Riyaz
Dattu, A Journei from Havana to Paris: The Fifti-Year Quest for the Elusive Mlultilateral
Agreement on Investment, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 275 (2000) (discussing the failed MIA
negotiations).
25. Customary International Law is applicable to investment but its content is limited and
disputed.
26. TRIMS mainly prohibits performance requirements which are contrary to national
Summer 2015
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Services ("GATS") agreement, under Mode-3 Commitments on
commercial presence, applies to some kinds of investment in
services.27
The main source of international investment law is other treaties,
sometimes called IIAs, which include preferential trade and
investment agreements ("PTIAs"). 8 These address investment and
BITs) 9 They provide more comprehensive rules on investment. IIAs
also include double taxation agreements ("DTAs").30 Many IIAs
treatment of goods (such as local sourcing requirements) or which create a quota on goods). See
JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: GLOBAL GOVERNMENT 20-21,
200-01 (2013). For insightful applications of this model to the WTO and other international
trade agreements, see generally Henrik Horn, Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger, Trade
Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 394 (2010); Julien
Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita, laintaining the WTO 's Supremacy in the International Trade
Order- A Proposal to Refine andRevise the Role of the Trade Polic R evie Mlechanism, 16 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 9 (2013); Pierpalo Battigalli & Giovani Maggi, International Agreements on
Product Standards: An Incomplete Contracting Theor (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 9533, 2003); Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, The Dark Side
of the loon: 'Completing'the W4TO Contract Through Adjudication (Eur. Univ. Inst., Global
Governance Programme Working Paper, 2012); Julien Chaisse & Debashis Chakraborty,
Implementing W4TO Rules Through Negotiations and Sanctions The Role of Trade Policy
Revieiw lechanism andDispute Settlement Sistem, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 153 (2007). See
also LAUGE SKOVGAARD POULSEN, POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE AND BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES: A VIEW FROM BELOW, COLUM. FDI PERSPECTIVES (2010), available
at http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/political-risk-insurance-and-bilateral-investment-treati
es-view-below; Julien Chaisse, The Regulation of Trade-Distorting Restrictions in Foreign
Investment Lair An Investigation of China's TRIAls Compliance, 3 FUR. YEARBOOK OF INT'L
ECON. L. 159 (2012); J. Y. Willems, The Settlement of Investor State Disputes and China New
Developments on ICSID Jurisdiction, 8 S.C. J. OF INT'L L. AND BUS. 1 (2011).
27. This includes services supplied by a service supplier of one State, through commercial
presence in the territory of the other State. Cf General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr.
15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183.
28. See Barbara Kotschwar, Alapping Investment Provisions in Regional Trade
Agreements: Towards an International Investment Regime?, in REGIONAL RULES IN THE
GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 365, 365 (Antoni Estevadeordal et al. eds., 2009). For a
comprehensive overview of the great variety of FTAs, see generally REGIONAL RULES IN THE
GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (Antoni Estevadeordal et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2009).
29. See HOUTHOFF BURUMA, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: THE ROLE OF BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES (2012), available at http://www.houthoff.com/uploads/tx-hh
publications/BrochureArbitration_2012.pdf; see also Nico Schrijver & Vid Prislan,
Netherlands, in COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL INVESTMENT TREATIES 535 (Chester
Brown ed., 2013).
30. See K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on Their
0 rigin, Purposes, and General Treatment Standards, 4 INT'L TAX & BUS. LAW 105, 112 (1986).
See also Sara Jamieson, A Alodel Future: The Future of Foreizgn Direct Investment and
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 53 S. TEX. L. REV. 605, 607 (2012). IhAs determine the extent
states have sovereignty to enforce jurisdiction over foreign investors within its domestic legal
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(other than DTAs) provide for investor-state dispute ("ISD")
settlement.31  About two-thirds of cases are handled under the
International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
("ICSID,).32 This convention does not create any substantive
obligation on party states, but offers only a dispute resolution process
for ISD settlement.33
Bilateral treaties are symmetric in the sense that they establish
identical rights and obligations for both parties.34  The conclusion of
these treaties binding unilateral commitments of states represents the
internationalization of these commitments. This is because an
international agreement is considered to deliver better standards and
more reliable protection than national law alone, which can be
modified unilaterally. 3 The agreement, to this effect, traces the legal
framework of general application to publicly and solemnly define a
system.
31. See Jennifer L. Tobin & Marc L. Busch, A BIT Is Better than a Lot. Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Preferential Trade Agreements, 62 WORLD POLITICS 4 (2010).
32. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter
ICSID Convention]. The ICSID Convention came into force in October 1966. The rules and
regulations were modeled on different sources. See Antonio R. Parra, The Development of the
Regulations and Rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 22
ICSID REV. L.J. 55, 55-57 (2007) (describing the creation of ICSID, and its rules and
regulations and noting that the rules "also drew inspiration from, among other sources, the
Statute and Rules of the World Court, the International Law Commission's 1958 Model Rules
on Arbitral Procedure and the Permanent Court of Arbitration's 1962 Rules for Arbitration and
Conciliation for Settlement of International Disputes Between Two Parties of Which Only One
is a State"). For a general commentary, see Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, in SELECTED ESSAYS:
WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 188, 198 (1995).
33. See generallr Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Toward a Greater Depoliticization of Investment
Disputes. The Role of ICSID and AIGA, in INVESTING WITH CONFIDENCE: UNDERSTANDING
POLITICAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (Kevin W. Lu, Gero Verheyen &
Srilal M. Perera eds., 2009).
34. See Alexandra N. Diehl, Tracing a Success Stori. or, "The Bab Boom of BITs'"
Characteristics and Particularities of the Tight Net of Bilateral Investment Treaties Existing
Todai, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW IN CONTEXT 7, 11 (August Reinisch et al. eds.,
2008).
35. Thus the bilateral treaty is an agreement between two sovereign states, usually between
a capital exporter and an importer of capital. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment
Liberalization and Economic Development. The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501,523 (1998). See also Andrew Guzman, IKhiLDCs Sign Treaties
That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L.
639, 660 (1997).
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balanced set of rights and duties for each of the contracting parties.
This general framework is reduced in all cases to the famous triptych:
treatment, protection, and investment guarantee.
The "purpose of investment treaties is closely tied . . . to the
removal of obstacles that may stand in the way of allowing and
channeling more foreign investment into the host states."36 Thus,
from a policy point of view, "the host state deliberately renounces an
element of its sovereignty in return for a certain new opportunity: the
chance to better attract new foreign investments, which it would not
have acquired in the absence of a treaty. 37 Professor Andrew Kerner
argues that BITs address the credibility problem in two ways: firstly,
ex-ante costs (signals), and, secondly, ex-post costs (commitments).
The interplay between these two is important: "In a setting of
imperfect information, all commitments are signals but not all signals
are commitments., 38 Signaling, in the case of IIAs and FDI, may be
defined as "sending a broadly received "signal" that a country is
trustworthy., 39 There are many types of signals possible, and hence
signals comprise a wide range of policy actions of the host country
government. In other words, doubts about the true intentions of the
host country government -based on the above-described information
asymmetry-can be reduced on the part of the investors, as they
"update" their beliefs when the host country signs or ratifies a BIT.
Hands-tying of ratifying host states is manifested when IIAs "present
significant ex-post costs to signatory states that violate the
agreement. 40 In this view, a BIT is a commitment device.41
36. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, supra note 18, at 22.
37. Id. at 23.
38. Michael Tomz, Do International Agreements Make Reforms More Credible? The
Impact of NAFTA on Mexican Stock Prices (1997) (on file with the Harvard Center for
International Affairs), available athttp://web.stanford.edu/-tomz/working/credible.pdf.
39. Andrew Kerner, Ihi Should IBelieve You? The Costs and Consequences of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 53 INT'L. STUD. Q. 73, 74 (2009).
40. Id. at 73-102.
41. How do commitments raise ex-post costs? According to Tim B0the and Helen Milner,
formal agreements, such as treaties, make them more visible. For example, most BITs can easily
be downloaded from the web. In addition, organizations like UNCTAD publish reports on
investment policies of (some of) their member states. Also, multinational enterprises that
benefit from BITs have an incentive to make violations of BITs public. Reasons like the
aforementioned thus make commitments more credible and hence should lead to more FDI.
Yet, by far the most important reason why BITs make commitments more credible is that there
is a mechanism that makes it easier "to bring costly pressure on governments if they do not
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Since a BIT includes a number of commitments between two
sovereign governments, violating a BIT (i.e., deviating from
announced policy) "constitutes a breach of international
commitments, which should make those commitments more costly to
break. 4  In summary, commitments enshrined in IIAs have the
potential to overcome the problems of time-inconsistency and
adverse selection simultaneously. An efficient agreement between
the host state and the investor can be reached, because the hands-
tying and the signaling mechanism lead to the fact that commitments
by the host state are seen as (more) credible by the investor.
As Professors Srividya Jandhyala and Robert Weiner summarize,
"BITs provide greater certainty about the future treatment of assets
by the state . . . which allow[s] firms to appropriate higher returns
from their foreign assets., 43 Thus, (more) efficient location choices
can be made, and hence conceptually BITs should have a positive
effect on FDI.44 There are certain limitations to this view, and they
are discussed in the concluding section. In addition to the theoretical
reasoning above, Jandhyala et al. argue convincingly on the basis of
empirical evidence that the motives for BITs have changed over time:
"As the density of BITs among peer countries increased, more
countries signed them in order to gain legitimacy and acceptance
without a full understanding of their costs and competencies." 45 Thus,
a plausible conclusion may be that the effects of IlAs may have
carry through on those promises." Tim Buthe & Helen Milner, The Politics of Foreign Direct
Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade
Agreements, 52 AM. J. POLIT. SCI. 741, 745-46 (2008). This is the invstor-state dispute
settlement mechanism.
42. Note the difference between the first and the second argument, which is due to the fact
that the first argument refers to all investors, including those not covered by the BIT in
question, while the second refers only to investors covered by the BIT. Id. at 744.
43. Srividya Jandhyala & Robert Weiner, Do InternationalInvestment Areements Protect
Investment? Petroleum Evidence (Aug. 26, 2012) (on file with the George Washington
University International Business Department), available at http://economics.ca/cree20l2/
paper/018.pdf, at 10.
44. The impact of substantive protections provided by international investment treaties
("ITTs") on the efficiency of decisions made by investors are analysed conceptually in Jonathan
Bonnitcha & Emma Aisbett, An Economic Analisis of the Substantive Protections Provided bY
Investment Treaties, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2011-
2012 681, 688 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2012).
45. Srividya Jandhyala et al., Three Waves of BITs. The Global Diffusion of Foreign
Investment Polici; 55 J. CONFL. RESOLUT. 1047 (2011).
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changed over time in parallel with the motives.46
In terms of legal substance, practice shows that nearly all IIAs
cover the following topics (see details in Table 1):
Table 1: The t olog of Bilateral In vestment Treaties rotection
Liberalization of cross- Market acccss: Admission %s. establishment.
border investment flows (,uarantcc ol Irce trans[cr ol pa 3 ments. ol capital and returns.
related to h)reign inestment. olten q ualiIicd b\ exceptions in
case o balance o pa ients problemis.
Non-discrimination Principle of national treatment for foreign investors, but often
principle subject to qualifications and exceptions.
MIEN treatment, subject to standardized exceptions.
Regulatory constraint and I air and equitable trealment ol torCign in estors.
investment protection Right ol the host countr\ to expropriate foreigl in'estors.
subject to the condition that expropriation is non-discrminlnator\
and accompanied b\ adequate compensation.
Access to international State-to-state dispute settlement provisions, and increasingly also
dispute settlement investor-to-state dispute settlement.
(Arbitration)
Source: Elaboration by the author.
There has been a dramatic expansion in the number of
international investment treaties. More than 5,900 treaties worldwide
are dealing with investment issues. 47  During the last decade the
increase was about forty percent. This complex network of treaties is
sometimes referred to as a "Spaghetti Bowl." Asian countries have
been generally been leading the recent growth in IIAs. More than
2,800 BITs, involving 179 countries, have been signed. 48 Regarding
arbitration under IIAs, there have been more than 450 known cases.
46. See Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct
Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 397, 397-442 (2010)
(summarizing much of the empirical literature on the conflicting evidence on whether
investment treaties lead to increased foreign investment); U.N. Conference on Trade &
Development, The Role of International Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct
Investment to Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/5 (Dec. 1, 2009),
available athttp://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia20095-en.pdf.
47. U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev. (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2013 xii, xix
(2013).
48. The annual growth rate peaked in 2001, while in 2013 there were thirty-three new BITs.
More than three hundred bilateral and regional PTIAs have been signed, with fourteen new
PTIAs during the last year. The number of PTIAs doubled between 2003 and 2014. See id.
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The majority of cases (more than sixty percent) emerged after 2004,
with forty-six claims in the last year alone. About ninety percent of
cases are from investors of developed countries against developing
countries. Out of 450 cases, 220 were concluded prior to December
31, 2013, with only twenty-six being concluded in 2014.49 Of the
decisions, forty percent were in favor of the host country, while thirty
percent were in favor of investors, and thirty percent settled.0
IIAs that are BITs and PTIAs with chapters on investment offer
comprehensive rules on investment. The main purpose of IIAs is to
ensure a stable and predictable environment for investment, through
investor protection (including relative and absolute standards, as
discussed below) and giving access to investor and state arbitration in
a case of a breach of a treaty obligation. A few IIAs also provide
market access for investors. An important goal for most states of
their commitment to providing this protection is the attraction of
foreign investment.
B. DEFINING TIE SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF IIAs
From an economic policy point of view, IIAs have two rationales:
firstly, the "inward" rationale of IIAs is to attract inward FDJ and,
secondly, the "outward" rationale of IIAs is to protect investors
abroad.51  From a national viewpoint, the question arises whether
these assumed effects of IIAs occur at all and (if so) how large these
effects are.52 This is an empirical question. Needless to mention, the
49. UNCTAD, supra note 47.
50. Id.
51. Hence, the assumed effects of IhAs on FDI are twofold: (1) a positive effect on inward
FDI is likely, because a host country provides an institutional element, which may not be
available in other host countries and thus reduce the costs of investing in otherwise comparable
locations, and (2) a positive effect on outiward FDI is hypothesized, because FDI to riskier
countries will increase, ceteris paribus, if the institutional environment is improved and
investors are protected and thus political risks are reduced. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Model
Bilateralln vestment Treaties. The gai Forwrard, 18 SW. J. INT'L LAW 307, 310-12 (2011).
52. The United States Trade Representative's office recognized that the goals of the United
States Bilateral Investment Treaties Program were the protection of United States' investments
abroad, the encouragement and adoption in foreign countries of policies that treat private
investment fairly, and the support of the development of international law standards that are
consistent with the stated goals. See also Jeffrey Lang, Keynote Address, 31 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 455, 457 (1998).
Summer 2015
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
above-described effects of IIAs on FDI can be appropriately assessed
only in empirical studies if IIAs are adequately measured. Studies
have only used information on the number of BITs of a country
(newly concluded or cumulative). 3 Because IIAs consist of many
provisions, the implicit assumption that they are all equal cannot be
justified. These differences in legal provisions are crucial when it
comes to the application of IIAs in practice, e.g., in investment
disputes or at a foreign market entry of a firm. Therefore, using only
the number of IIAs implies imprecise measurement of differences
between IIAs and hence they are important determinants of their
effect on FDI. It is conceivable that investors are aware of publicly
known investor-state disputes. The economic justification of IIAs is
derived from two types of market failure, which explain the fact that
sometimes investment policies lack credibility. 4 As a consequence of
the lack of credibility, an efficient investment, which would otherwise
have taken place, is not carried out in the absence of a BIT. These
arguments pertain to the existence of adverse selection and time
inconsistency, also known as a holdup problem.5
53. But see Matthias Busse et al., FDI Promotion Through Bilateral Investment Treaties.
Afore than a Bit?, 146 REV. WORLD ECON. 147, 147-77 (2010).
54. The lack of credibility is a very negative location factor for host countries. Broadly
understood, it implies that the country is not seen as a reliable or safe place for foreign
investors. In order to attract foreign investment, a prime objective of the host country is to find
ways and means to correct or diminish the lack of credibility. This can take two forms: either
adverse selection or time inconsistency. Adverse selection is based on a microeconomic
perspective, and it refers to the fact that information about the true intentions of a government
may be private, i.e., "when observers lack information about the beliefs and values that are
motivating a government to pursue" a certain policy, e.g., liberalizing capital flows. Tomz, supra
note 38, at 2. Kerner uses the term "beliefs over a state's intentions." Kerner, supra note 39, at
74. This can be even more pronounced, if the government in question is a foreign government of
a country, which lacks credible institutions, e.g., some developing countries. As South-South
IhAs are increasing, this information asymmetry problem exists increasingly with respect to both
treaty partners, while in a developed-developing country context it existed unilaterally for
investors from the developed country only.
55. Both are well-known in the literature on economic policy. See Guzman, supra note 35,
at 639-88. A brief exposition suffices here: How does the credibility problem derive from these
two arguments, and are BITs an appropriate (efficient) answer to this problem? We discuss
these problems here in light of the obsolescing bargain, i.e., "once a firm undertakes a foreign
direct investment, some bargaining power shifts to the host country government, which has an
incentive to change the terms of the investment to reap a greater share of the benefits." Buthe
& Milner, supra note 41, at 743. Given the "obsolescing bargain" argument, it is noteworthy at
the outset that this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient precondition for the credibility
problem to arise; this is because there need not be an intent to deceive on the part of the host.
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Given the fragmented international rules on investment, IIAs are
considered to be the most comprehensive rules which cover the
aspects of protection of investment and its related issues. The
increased importance of IIAs necessitates the need to understand the
scope of application of any 11A, with which a state has to comply.
The four most important issues of comprehension relating to the
scope of application in IAs include: (1) what is the definition of
"investor" and "investment"?; (2) when should the treaty obligations
start'?; (3) does the treaty cover only new investments after the treaty
is in place or it is also valid for existing investments'?; and (4) when
does the treaty obligation end'? On termination of the treaty should
the obligations end or continue for a specified period of time for
existing investments'?
As discussed above, the classic economic concept of FDJ as
investment involves a transfer of funds or a commitment to transfer of
substantial assets for a time period of more than a year, where profit
is expected, the person transferring funds participates in
management, business risk is assumed, and the investment is expected
to contribute to the development of the host state. 6
Most h1A definitions extend the scope of the agreement to a
much broader conception of investment.s Commonly, IAs adopt a
broad definition called an "Open Ended Definition" that includes
every kind of asset (even intellectual property, etc.).5 8 More recently,
Rather, adverse selection and time inconsistency aggravate the obsolescing bargain. Buthe &
Milner argue that time inconsistency aggravates the obsolescing bargain. See Buthe & Milner,
supra note 41, at 744. Bonnitcha and Aisbett mention that these terms are used interchangeably.
See Bonnitcha & Aisbett, supra note 44, at 688.
56. See Howard Mann, Reconceptualizing International Investment Lawr: Its Role in
Sustainable development, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 521, 521 (2013).
57. On the diverse nature of an "investment," see Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emering
Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113 PENN. STATE L. REV. 1269, 1297 (2009); Joseph M.
Boddicker, Whose Dictionary Controls?: Recent Challenges to the Term "Investment" in
ICSID Arbitration, 25 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1031, 1034-35 (2010); Julien Burda, A New Step
Towards a Single and Common Definition of an Investment? - Comments on the Romak versus
Uzbekistan Decision, 11(6) J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 1085 (2010); Noah Rubins, The Notion of
"Investment in International Investment Arbitration, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT
DISPUTES, 283-84 (Norbert Horn ed., 2004). See generally Julian Davis Mortenson, The
Mleaning of "Inivestment" ICSID 's Travaux and the Domain of International Investment Laf,
51(1) HARV. INT'L L. J. 257 (2010).
58. See Tania S. Voon, Andrew D. Mitchell & James Munro, Intellectual Property Rights
in International Investment Agreements: Striving for Coherence in National and International
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a "Closed Ended Definition" has also been introduced in IIAs that
limits investment to categories that are specified in a list. In such
cases, however, the list could sometimes be quite long. In both cases,
the definition may or may not require that investment must possess
the characteristics of the classic concept of investment to qualify for
protection. 9 There are also some agreements where there are
specific exclusions from the definition of investment.
III. EXPLORING THE PRACTICE OF TREATY SHOPPING
Treaty obligations apply only to the "investments" of
"investors," as defined in the treaty. The key legal question is thus,
who is an investor and what is an investment'? The Saluka
Investments B. V v. Czech Republic tribunal expressed some
sympathy for the argument that a company that has no real
connection with a state party to a BIT and that is in reality a mere
shell company controlled by another company, which is not
constituted under the laws of that state, should not be entitled to
invoke that treaty. The tribunal noted that this lends itself to abuses
of the arbitral procedure, and to practices of "treaty shopping" that
can share many of the disadvantages of the widely criticized practice
of "forum shopping." However, the predominant factor that must
Lawt, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AFTER THE CRISIS: A TALE OF FRAGMENTED
DISCIPLINES 7 (C.L. Lim & Bryan Mercurio eds., 2015), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-2318955. See also Emmanuel Gaillard, Identifi or Define? Reflections
on the Evolution of the Concept of Investment in ICSID Practice, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER
404 (Christina Binder, Ursula Kriebaum, August Reinisch & Stephan Wittich eds., Oxford
2009) (delineating the four elements of the Salini test for defining the term investment: (1)
"contributions," (2) "duration of performance of the contract," (3) "participation in the risks of
the transaction," and (4) "contribution to the economic development of the host State"). On the
role of the TRIPs Agreement, see generalli Julien Chaisse & Puneeth Nagaraj, Changing
Lanes-Trade, Investment and Intellectual Property Rights, 36 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 223 (2014).
59. For instance, the Pakistan-Malaysia Closer Economic Partnership 2007 does require
that some of these characteristics are present. Article 88 requires that in addition to open ended
definition, there is a "Qualification Note" to be applied for eligibility of an investment: "Where
an asset lacks the characteristics of an investment, that asset is not an investment regardless of
the form it may take. The characteristics of an investment include the commitment of capital,
the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk." Malaysia-Pakistan Closer
Economic Partnership Agreement, Malay.-Pak., art. 88, Nov. 8, 2007, available at https://www.
yumpu.com/ en/document/view/37050283/malaysia-pakistan-wits/55.
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guide the tribunal's exercise of its functions is the terms in which the
parties to the treaty in question have agreed to establish the tribunal's
jurisdiction.60 Importantly, this was revisited by Hulley Enterprises v.
Russia, Yukos v. Russia, and Veteran Petroleum v. Russia Interim
Awards on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, citing the Saluka and
Petrobart decisions, hold that the principles of international law,
which have an unquestionable importance in treaty interpretation, do
not allow an arbitral tribunal to write new, additional requirements-
which the drafters did not include-into a treaty, no matter how
auspicious or appropriate they may appear.61 Last but not least, Pac
Rim Gayman v. Republic El Salvador Decision on the Respondent's
Jurisdictional Objections noted that a corporate restructuring
affecting a claimant's nationality should not be considered as an
abuse of process if it was done in good faith before the occurrence of
any event or measure giving rise to a later dispute.62
In order to address the issue, treaty shopping countries always
consider the following two main legal issues. First, what kind of
investments will benefit from the treaty obligation'? Generally,
capital-exporting states would like to have a broad definition to
ensure that their investors are protected regardless of the form of
their investment. Host states may be concerned that a broad
definition of investment creates a substantial risk of investor-state
claims. 63 Second, what type of investment would a state like to
attract'? Does a host state want to attract FDI or portfolio or both'?
Each of the existing IIAs reflects a careful analysis of these elements.
Section A first reviews the main issues raised by treaty shopping
before looking at three disputes which shed light on the practices of
treaty shopping.64 Section B will focus on a case of upstream change.
60. Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 240-41
(Mar. 17, 2006).
61. Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. Russian Federation, PCA Case No. 228,
Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 414-15 (Nov. 30, 2009).
62. Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12,
Decision on Jurisdictional Objections, 2.47 (June 1, 2012).
63. Host states may also be concerned about whether there are any areas of state policy
that would be affected by the scope of the definition. For example, some countries would not
like to include state debt obligations in order to have flexibility to deal with such obligations in
the face of a balance-of-payments crisis.
64. See Roos VAN Os & ROELINE KNOTTNERUS, DUTCH BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES: A GATEWAY TO 'TREATY SHOPPING' FOR INVESTMENT PROTECTION BY
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Section C analyzes the hypothesis of a downstream reorganization
upon an already existing dispute. Finally, Section D reviews the
hypothesis of a bad faith abuse of arbitration.
A. IssuEs RAISED BY TREATY SHOPPING
Given the number of agreements involved, the problem of treaty
shopping becomes serious in the case of intersected agreements.65
Whereas the problem of nested agreements is limited to the choice
between a limited number of agreements that include the same
parties (a trilateral A-B-C agreement versus a bilateral B-C
agreement), there are many options in the case of intersected
agreements if treaty shopping becomes an issue.
However, treaty shopping is relatively less serious in the field of
trade (in goods). This is mainly because there is an established
concept of rules of origin ("ROO") for goods trade. It is natural that
an export from Country B to Country A uses an A-B agreement to
secure preferential access. There is still a possibility that an A-C
agreement could be used for export from Country B to Country A,
depending on the ROO stipulated in the A-C agreement. However,
this certainly leads to more options for traders: a trader in Country B
can use both an A-B agreement and an A-C agreement. Some may
argue that the unexpected use of an agreement (the use of an A-C
agreement by a trader in Country B exporting to Country A) could be
problematic. Such an unexpected use of an agreement by traders
leads to uncertainty from a policy perspective, but this essentially
increases business opportunities. Moreover, an agreement's "leaky"
ROO that leads to an unexpected way of using the agreement simply
MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES 9 (2011), available at http://somo.nl/publications-en/Publication
3708.
65. Because a large number of agreements have been signed in Asia and in the wider world,
intersected agreements are a common phenomenon. The issue of intersected agreements occurs
if one country signs an agreement with two different partners separately. It is very unrealistic to
assume that those agreements have a similar legal regime on FDI. Thus, the issue of intersected
agreements is aggravated by the indefinite number of agreements involved. If one country signs
ten agreements with ten different partners, all those agreements constitute an intersected
agreement problem. In the case of nested agreements, the number of the concerned agreements
is relatively limited.
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reduces the discriminatory effects of FTAs and is thus welfare-
enhancing.
In the case of investment, treaty shopping problems seem to be
more serious than in the case of goods because the origin of investor
and investment is more ambiguous. IIAs usually employ a very broad
definition of investment and the qualification for an investor is
usually not demanding. Moreover, one should note that investors are
mobile. This is especially true for multinational corporations
("MNCs"). Thus, MNCs have a temptation to partially relocate their
bases, so that their investment assets are best protected by selecting
the economy that has a favorable IIA with the hosting country of its
investment. In short, treaty shopping leads to more legal options for
investors.
This is a problem because IAs usually involve ISD mechanisms
under which a state could be sued by an investor. The uncertainty
with regard to the origin determination of firms and the mobility of
firms may lead to an unexpected ISD dispute, which is not favorable
for governments. Interestingly, even a firm in a third country, which
has no IIA with the concerned country, may file a claim against it.
In 2010, Australia introduced plain packaging for all tobacco
products (drab dark brown with no trademarks) (Table 2). The
purpose of the new bill is to discourage smoking initiation and to
implement the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
("FCTC"), as imposed by the WHO. However, this regulation, which
aims to protect consumer health, was first challenged before
Australian domestic courts without success.66  Now it is being
challenged by the Philip Morris Incorporation ("PMI") before an
international tribunal for an alleged breach of the Hong Kong,
China-Australia BIT.67 How did we reach the question whether
66. See JTInt7 SA v Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43 (Austl.). For a review of all court
documents on Philip Morris's unsuccessful constitutional challenge before the High Court of
Australia, see eenerally British Am. Tobacco Australasia Ltd. v Common wealth [2010] HCA 43
(Austl.), available athttp:// www.hcourt.gov.au/cases/case-s389/2011; Philip Mlorris Ltd. v Prime
Mlinister [2011] AATA 556 (Austl.) (Philip Morris's unsuccessful claim against the Prime
Minister of Australia).
67. This agreement is technically titled "Agreement between the Government of Hong
Kong and the Government of Australia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments." See
Philip M-orris Asia Initiates Legal Action Against the Australian Government Over Plain
Packaging, PHILIP MORRIS INT'L (June 27, 2011), http://www.pmi.com/eng/media-center
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Australia's plain packaging legislation violates a Hong Kong, China-
Australia BIT'? Actually, PMI launched proceedings via an Asian
subsidiary even though it is an American company based in Virginia.
Indeed, the USA-Australia FTA does not have ISD settlement and
would not allow PMI to sue Australia for a breach of the USA-
Australia FTA.
Table 2 Australian Tobacco Regulation Timeline
Pl'AW , ,, 7 ,,§M -w; I'MI servta Notice of (Claim to Australia to initiate negotiations
's;. A . PA410 b tc,, raritration
lobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 and Trademarks Amendment
~4'j(Tfobacco Plain Packaging) bill receive final legislati% e apprNnak; PMI1
announces it wiIl pursue remedies via the tlong Kong, China-
Australia 1I] and domestically in the AtLsLtalian courts
- iPMI files writ against the Australian government
S 1,Ju: raine comlfphls to WI C
-Z I obacco legislation in force
20e ' Australian I uigh Court rejects PMtIl's clim
Main arbitration hearings and international A% ard expected in 2015
Source: Author's compilation.
As can be imagined, Australia never intended to give up its
regulatory power to address health issues in the 1996 BIT concluded
with Hong Kong, China. Equally unanticipated was the idea of a
claim brought by an investor that is formally registered in Hong
Kong, China but is commonly known as a powerful American MNC.
Of course, one must expect a sovereign state such as Australia to
anticipate such developments. However, one also perceives the
considerable challenges raised by MNCs and their capacity to
opportunely relocate to new jurisdictions to benefit from more
/press releases/pages/PMAsia plain-packaging.aspx (on Philip Morris' initiation of an action
against Australia under the Australia-Hong Kong Free Trade Agreement). See generally
Tobacco Plain PackaginQg Act 2011 (Cth) No. 148 (Austrl. 2011); see also Julien Chaisse,
Deconstructing the W4TO Conformity Oblitation-A Theory of Compliance as a Process 38
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 57 (2015); Simon Chapman & Becky Freeman, The Cancer Emperor's
New Clothes: Australia 's Historic Legislation for Plain Tobacco Packaging, 340 BRIT MED. J.
2436 (2010); Tania Voon & Andrew Mitchell, Implications of IWTO Lar for Plain Packaging of
Tobacco Products, in PUBLIC HEALTH AND PLAIN PACKAGING OF CIGARETTES: LEGAL ISSUES
(Edward Elger ed., 2012), available athttp://ssrn.com/abstract-1874593.
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favorable rights. One can also observe the policy ramifications since
the potential use of investment arbitration to challenge tobacco
regulations has become a source of controversy in TPP negotiations.68
The dispute between PMI and Australia is generating
considerable debate. 69 However, the practice known as investment
structuring can be conducted. Investment structuring consists of
giving the adequate legal shape and structure to an investment. For
instance, a U.S. company wishes to contract with the Government of
Pakistan to build, operate, and maintain a power plant in Pakistan.
Although Pakistan has not entered into an investment treaty with the
United States, the company may gain treaty protection under the
Pakistan-Switzerland BIT by operating its investment through
Switzerland. Its Swiss operations may also be protected by the
Switzerland-Pakistan IIA. According to Clayton-Utz,
[there] may be circumstances where the host State of your
investment has not entered into an investment treaty with your
home State, be it Australia or another country. The good news is
that you may still be able to obtain investment treaty protection.
This may be achieved by structuring your investment through a
third country that has entered into an investment treaty with the
host State. In this way, you can make use of the protection
available under that investment treaty to protect your investment in
the host State.70
It would be difficult to assess the amount of FDI that has been
adjusted through legal investment structuring, but it is important to
understand that this kind of legal service is provided by law firms
from Hong Kong, China to Zurich, and including Tokyo, Singapore,
and New York. This trend may lead to two opposite conclusions.
The first would be to say that the concept of nationality is dead and
irrelevant in the globalized economy. It is a tempting conclusion that
68. Tania Voon & Andrew Mitchell, Time to Quit? Assessing International Investment
Claims against Plain Tobacco Packaging in Australia, 14 J. INT'L ECON. L. 515,552 (2011).
69. See Chapman & Freeman, supra note 67 (on the Phillip Morris dispute); Voon &
Mitchell, supra note 67; see Philip Morris, Ltd. v. Prime Minister, JIT Int'l SA v. Commonwealth
[2012] HCA 43 (Austl.) (on Philip Morris's unsuccessful claim against the Prime Minister of
Australia).
70. CLAYTON UTZ, GUIDE TO PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENTS (2011), available at
http://www.claytonutz.com/docs/Guide-to-protecting-foreign-investments.pdf.
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was partly predicted by Karl Polanyi's Great Transformation."
However, one must also agree that states retain some power to
legitimately control the actions of large MNCs. In this regard, the
current investment scenario obliges states to find new tools to better
anticipate the future application of their IIAs, especially intersected
IIAs.
The problems caused by common member agreements differ
from goods to investment. First, the status of nested and overlapped
agreement brings more options to traders of availing tariff
preferences, although this may lead to inconsistency of regulation in
the case of international investment. Second, in the case of
intersected agreements, the unexpected way of using FTAs basically
reduces the negative aspect of FTAs, such as exclusiveness. In the
case of investment, intersected IhAs would lead to unexpected
investor-state disputes.
1. Legitimate Extension of Rights and Benefits by Means of the
Operation of the MFN Clause
In 2000, the Maffezini v. Spain Decision on Objections to
Jurisdiction noted, in discussing the MFN clause, that a distinction
had to be made between the legitimate extension of rights and
benefits by means of the operation of the clause, and disruptive treaty
shopping that would play havoc with the policy objectives of
underlying specific treaty provisions.- However, it is true that, as
underscored by the Tribunal in Telenor v. Hungary Award, the effect
of the wide interpretation of the MEN clause is to expose the host
state to treaty shopping by the investor among an indeterminate
number of treaties to find a dispute resolution clause wide enough to
cover a dispute that would fall outside the dispute resolution clause in
the base treaty. 73
71. KARL POLANYI, GREAT TRANSFORMATION (2nd ed. Beacon Press 2001).
72. See Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award, Q 63 (Nov. 13,
2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 419 (20(P).
73. See Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/15, Award, 93 (Sept. 13,2006).
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2. Structuring (and Restructuring) of Investments to Gain Access to
InternationalJurisdiction
The Cementownia v. Turkey Award observed that treaty
shopping per se is not in principle to be disapproved of, but in some
instances, it has been found to be a mere artifice employed to
manufacture an international dispute out of a purely domestic
dispute."
Creating a legal entity in a host country cannot be in itself read
as a bad maneuver. In the Tokelds v. Ukraine Decision on
Jurisdiction, the majority distinguished between the creation of
foreign legal personality for legitimate commercial planning purposes
and the kind of conduct which the International Court of Justice
("ICJ") noted (in Barcelona Traction); this conduct can lead to the
piercing of the veil in municipal legal systems.75
The Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia Decision on Objections to
Jurisdiction held that it is not uncommon in practice, and in the
absence of a particular limitation not illegal, to locate one's
operations in a jurisdiction perceived to provide a beneficial
regulatory and legal environment in terms, for example, of taxation or
the substantive law of the jurisdiction, including the availability of a
BIT.
6
However, the Phoenix Action v. Czech Republic Award held
that when a party makes an investment, not for the purpose of
engaging in commercial activity, but for the sole purpose of gaining
access to international jurisdiction, it does not engage in a bona fide
transaction.77  The Mobil v. Venezuela Decision on Jurisdiction
considered that to restructure investments only in order to gain
74. See Cementownia "Nowa Huta" S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/06/2, Award, 1 117 (Sept. 17, 2009).
75. See Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/(P/18, Decision on Jurisdiction,
S54-55 (Apr. 29, 2004).
76. Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on
Respondent's Objections to Jurisdiction, 1 320-21 (Oct. 21, 2005); Aguas del Tunari S.A. v.
Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/(P/3, Declaration of Jose Luis Alberro-Semerena, I
8 (Oct. 22, 2005) (finding that corporate restructuring results in the balance between the
benefits and obligation of the host State becoming unpredictable).
77. Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 11 142-
144 (Apr. 15, 2009).
Summer 2015
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
jurisdiction under a BIT for such disputes would constitute, to quote
Phoenix Action, "an abusive manipulation of the system of
international investment protection under the ICSID Convention and
the BITs" (but it finds no abuse of rights in restructuring investment
to obtain BIT protection).78
The BIVA C v. Paraguay Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction
found that the claimant fills the requirements of being a juridical
person having the nationality of one of the two parties to the BIT and
no evidence had been put before it to indicate that the entity was
created to take advantage of a favorable BIT.79 Also, the BIVAC v.
Paraguay Further Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction considered
the fact that international groups of companies put different
strategies in place and that legal structures cannot of themselves be
considered to be inappropriate or even illegitimate, and cannot as
such justify any suspicions of a hidden agenda as to a future litigation
strategy.80
The Millicom International Operations v. Senegal Decision on
Jurisdiction noted that shares in the investment were held by Dutch
nationals and this predated the arbitration by several years; even if it
was possible, or even likely that the choice of the subsidiaries was also
made considering the protection that their domicile could afford
them, this fact alone could not constitute an abusive solution;81 there
would also need to be circumstances which would demonstrate that
such choice was made unknown to the other party and under artificial
conditions.
The Conoco Phillips Petrozuata v. Venezuela Decision on
Jurisdiction and the Merits noted that the only business purpose of
the restructuring at issue was to be able to have access to ICSID
proceedings; however, at the time of the restructuring, no claim had
78. Venezuela Holdings B. V., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction,
189, 205.
79. Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment and Control, BIVAC B.V. v.
Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, Decision on Jurisdiction, 53 (May 29,
2009).
80. Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment and Control, BIVAC B.V. v.
Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, Further Decision on Objections to
Jurisdiction, 94 (Oct. 9, 2014).
81. Millicom International Operations B.V v. Republic of Senegal, ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/20, Decision on Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, 84 (July 16, 2010).
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been made, and, subject to one qualification, none was in prospect at
the time of the restructuring; in addition, a "major factor" in the
tribunal's view was that the claimant invested substantial sums of
money after the restructuring; this was evidence "telling strongly
against any finding of treaty abuse."8
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B. UPSTREAM CHANGES AND THE ISSUE OF ABUSE OF RIGHT
In Aguas del Tunari, the claimant sued Bolivia under the
Bolivia-Netherlands BIT."' The dispute arose from the failed
privatization of water and sewage services in the city of Cochabamba.
The privatization was based on a forty year concession contract and it
assigned to foreign companies the exclusive rights to provide water
and sewage services in Cochabamba. Public opposition arose from
the outset and then escalated. Public concerns related primarily to
higher rates and prohibitions on communal wells.
It emerged during the arbitration that, prior to bringing its claim
and as public opposition was developing, the foreign investor
83. See generalli Aguas del Tunari, S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3.
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"migrated" corporate ownership of the privatized assets from the
Cayman Islands to the Netherlands in order to have access to the
Netherlands-Bolivia BIT. This was done without the permission of
the Bolivian authorities which approved the original privatization.
Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia Decision on Respondent's Objections to
Jurisdiction found no support for an allegation of abuse of corporate
form or fraud, but noted that under Rule 41(2) of the ICSID
Arbitration Rules, it can consider on its own initiative at any stage of
the proceeding whether the dispute or any ancillary claim before it is
within its jurisdiction. 4
In the Aguas del Tunari, S.A., after a water and sanitary sewer
concession contract was concluded, the so-called "water war" started
in 1999, and the local population demanded termination of the
contract out of fear that prices would increase steeplyF8' In the
meantime, Aguas del Tunari changed its upstream ownership by
transferring a fifty-five-percent ownership stake to a Dutch company
in December 1999.
Figure 1. Corporate restructuring
Adr's ownrnhip .
structure in Sep, Internatlonal Water
1M9 Horungs BV
N .-A h e r~ an d '; t0 % A d t 's ow n ersh ip
. "structure after1"Iter aina watet C 1999
coon ( rdI- 55% International Water
Agwt 40 ThW14, 5.A
Source: Elaboration by the author
84. Aguas del Tunari, S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/(P/3, Decision on Respondent's
Objections to Jurisdiction, 331.
85. See Julien Chaisse, Globalization of ater Privatization-- Ramifications of Investor-
State Disputes in the 'Blue Gold'Economi; 39 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
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Four months later the concession was terminated. The tribunal
thus accepted that at the time of restructuring the investor could not
have contemplated the events which followed in the Spring of 2000,
and it concluded that in casu the restructuring did not amount to
abuse of process.86
The concept of abuse of the right to access ICSID Arbitration
has begun to play an important role at the jurisdictional stage of
ICSID proceedings, largely due to the widely adopted practice of
treaty shopping by investors who restructure their investments in
order to gain access to the jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals. Although
the exact parameters of the principle are not yet established, the
practices of ICSID tribunals provide a useful road map for future
cases.Y In this respect. the Metal-Tech v. LUzbekistan Award noted
that a breach of the general prohibition of abuse of right, which is a
manifestation of the principle of good faith, may give rise to an
objection to jurisdiction or to a defense on the merits.88 Also, the
ConocoPhillips Decision on Jurisdiction and the Merits, adverting to
the case law of the ICJ, the WTO, and ICSID tribunals, noted that
the principal reason that tribunals have given for not treating
compliance with formal or technical requirements as being sufficient
is to avoid the misuse of power conferred by law. 9
The Aguas del Tunaritribunal adopted a flexible approach to the
concept of corporate nationality under investment treaties. A
majority of the tribunal allowed the claim to proceed in spite of the
investor's migration of its investment to the Netherlands in order to
access arbitration under the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT.90  The
Bolivian-appointed arbitrator dissented on this issue, concluding that
the Bolivian authorities who approved the original investment should
have been consulted about the change in corporate ownership.
86. The claim was settled after an international campaign to pressurize the U.S. company
Bechtel, which was the main foreign firm involved in the privatization.
87. See Utku Topcan, Abuse of the Right to Access ICSID Arbitration, 29 ICSID REV. L.J.
627, 628 (2014).
88. Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, tY 127
(Oct. 4, 2013).
89. Conocophillips Petrozuata B. V., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Decision on Jurisdiction
and the Merits, 273.
90. A guas del Tunari S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/(P/3, Decision on Respondent's
Objections to Jurisdiction, II 334-37.
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Similarly, in Mobil v. Venezuela, the tribunal distinguished
between the already existing disputes relating to royalty payment and
income tax payment and a future one relating to the termination of
the concession. 91 Only in the latter hypothesis was the restructure
legitimate. 9' Notably, in this case the process of restructuring started
three years before the nationalization. 93
C. DOWNSTREAM REORGANIZATION UPON AN ALREADY EXISTING
DIsPuTE
Phoenix is an Israeli company that purchased two Czech
companies, Benet Praha ("BP") and Benet Group ("BG"), in 2002,
while these two companies were involved in ongoing legal disputes-
BG with a private party, BP with the Czech fiscal authorities.9 4 The
Czech Republic challenged the jurisdiction of the tribunal on the
basis that Phoenix was an expost facto sham Israeli entity created by
a Czech national in order to establish diversity of nationality. The
Czech Republic specifically asked the tribunal to decide whether a
foreign entity could be created for the sole purpose of establishing
diversity of nationality, thus triggering ICSID jurisdiction.95
First of all, the Phoenix Action considered that the principle of
good faith governs not only the relations between states, but also the
legal rights and duties of those seeking to assert an international
claim under a treaty: nobody shall abuse the rights granted by
treaties, and more generally, every rule of law includes an implied
clause that it should not be abused.
96
Phoenix Action held that the claimant committed an abuse of
rights (it could be called a "ddtournement de procddure," consisting
of its creation of a legal fiction in order to gain access to an
international arbitration procedure to which it was not entitled. 97
According to the tribunal in Phoenir Action "this alleged investment
91. Venezuela Holdings B. V, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction, 207.
92. Id. at 204-05.
93. Id. at 203.
94. PhoenixAction, Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, Q 28.
95. Phoenix Action, Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, at 34.
96. Id. at 107.
97. Id. at 143.
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was not made in order to engage in national economic activity, it was
made solely for the purpose of getting involved with international
legal activity.""8 In its decision, the tribunal revisited the oft-cited
"Salini test," which attempts to determine whether there is an
investment for the purposes of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention.
The Salini test sets out four criteria for an investment to qualify as
such under the ICSID Convention, i.e., (1) a contribution of money
or other assets of economic value, (2) a certain duration, (3) an
element of risk, and (4) a contribution to the host state's
development.
The tribunal refused to rely exclusively on the Salini test.99
Instead, the tribunal concluded that for an investment to benefit from
the international protection of ICSID, the following six elements had
to be taken into account: (1) a contribution in money or other assets;
(2) a certain duration; (3) an element of risk; (4) an operation made
in order to develop an economic activity in the host state; (5) assets
invested in accordance with the law of the host state; and (6) assets
invested bona fide.
The Phoenix Action decision was a novel development insofar as
the tribunal ruled that even in the absence of any provisions to that
end in the relevant treaty, an investment will benefit from the
protections of the treaty, and hence a tribunal will have jurisdiction,
only if the investment is made in accordance with the law of the host
state.
In the same vein, Venezuela Holdings v. Venezuela Decision on
Jurisdiction found no abuse of rights in restructuring an investment to
obtain BIT protection (but held that for preexisting disputes, to
restructure investments only in order to gain jurisdiction under a BIT
would, in the words of Phoenix Action, be an "abusive manipulation
of the system").to Tidewater Inc. v. Venezuela Decision on
98. Phoenix Action, Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, at 142.
99. Id. at 85. ("It is the Tribunal's view that the contribution of an international
investment to the development of the host State is impossible to ascertain-the more so as there
are highly diverging views on what constitutes "development." A less ambitious approach
should therefore be adopted, centered on the contribution of an international investment to the
economy of the host State, which is indeed normally inherent in the mere concept of investment
as shaped by the elements of contribution/duration/risk, and should therefore in principle be
presumed.")
100. Venezuala Holdins B. V., ICSID Case NO. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction, H
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Jurisdiction noted that it is a perfectly legitimate goal, and no abuse
of an investment protection treaty regime, for an investor to seek to
protect itself from the general risk of future disputes with a host
State; but the same is not the case in relation to preexisting disputes
between the specific investor and the State.0 1
Recently, this approach has been confirmed in the Sanum
Investments v. Laos Award on Jurisdiction, which approved the
finding in A guas del Tunari and Phoenix Action, and noted that the
search for a convenient place of incorporation is common practice
whether for fiscal reasons or for the network of investment treaties a
country may have concluded.10 -
D. BAD FAITH AB USE OF ARBITRATION (CEMENTO WNIA CASE)
Seeking damages in amounts exceeding four billion dollars,
Cementownia commenced arbitral proceedings against Turkey in the
fall of 2006 for alleged breaches of the Energy Charter Treaty
("ECT).'0 3 Similar to the facts in parallel proceedings against
Turkey which involve entities operated by the Uzan family,
Cementownia asserted its standing to commence international
arbitration on the basis of its alleged shareholdings in two Turkish
electricity corporations, (ukurova Elektrik A.S. ("CEAS") and
Kepez Elektrik Ttirk A.S. ("Kepez"), which saw their concession
agreements with the Turkish Ministry of Energy terminated in June
2003.
Crucial to the jurisdictional question facing the tribunal was
whether Cementownia had in fact acquired an interest in the two
Turkish electricity companies prior to the termination of their
concession agreements. In the face of such arguments, however,
Cementownia never adduced any concrete evidence substantiating
the precise timing of its share acquisitions. Consequently, after
204-05.
101. Tidewater Inc., Tidewater Inv. SRL, Tidewater Caribe C.A., Twenty Grand Marine
Offshore L.L.C., Jackson Marine L.L.C., Zapata Gulf Marine Operators L.L.C v. Bolivarian
Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, 184 (Feb. 8, 2013).
102. Sanum Investments Ltd. v. The Gov't of The Lao People's Democratic Republic, PCA
Case No. 2013-13, Award on Jurisdiction, II 309-10 (Dec. 13, 2013).
103. Cementoifnia 'Nowa Huta "S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/06/2, Award, 1-30.
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numerous unsuccessful requests for the production of the original
bearer share certificates, both parties sought dismissal of
Cementownia's claims on grounds that the tribunal lacked
jurisdiction, albeit with different reasoning.
Cementownia requested the tribunal to base its reasoning solely
on its inability to produce the original share certificates. In contrast,
Turkey requested the tribunal to render an award which scrutinized
all aspects of Cementownia's standing to sue and to dismiss the claim
with prejudice and with an award of damages and costs in its favor.
The tribunal made a number of findings that foreclosed
Cementownia's ability to recommence arbitral proceedings against
Turkey. 10 4 Given Cementownia's failure to produce original share
certificates evidencing its shareholdings in CEAS and Kepez, the
inconsistent evidence with respect to the precise date of
Cementownia's share acquisition, the circumstances in which the
share transaction occurred (i.e., via telephone and with rudimentary
contracts), and the fact that Cementownia did not record the share
transaction in its own financial statements in 2003 and 2004, the
tribunal decided that Cementownia ". . . had not produced any
persuasive evidence that could prove either its shareholding in CEAS
and Kepez at the relevant time or that it was an investor within the
meaning of the ECT."' '  In addition, the tribunal found that
Cementownia's claim was "manifestly ill-founded. 10 6 It also noted
that Cementownia ". . . intentionally and in bad faith abused the
arbitration; it purported to be an investor when it knew that this was
not the case . .. 07 and was "guilty of procedural misconduct: once
the arbitration proceeding was commenced, it . . . caused excessive
delays and thereby increased the costs of the arbitration. '108
After considering the arguments of both Cementownia and
Turkey, the tribunal sided with Turkey and decided to dismiss the
claim with prejudice in reason of the manifest bad faith of the
claimant. Such reasoning was later confirmed by Malicorp Limited v.
104. Cementoinia 'Nowa Huta "S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/06/2, Award, 86.
105. Id. at 149.
106. Id. at 157.
107. Id. at 159.
108. Id.
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Egypt. 09 As for the prejudice, the Cementownia tribunal is not
unique since where the unsuccessful claimant has engaged in some
form of abusive conduct, arbitral tribunals have ordered that the
claimant pay all or a significant part of the respondent's costs.110
IV. MAPPING THE CAUSE OF TREATY SHOPPING: QUEST
OF BENEFITS
The recent multiplication of IlAs offers a rich canvas against
which foreign corporations can develop their legal strategy. The
number of instruments are complemented by a rich, robust protection
found in these treaties. Indeed, by the terms of these bilateral
investment treaties, foreign investment is assured fair and equitable
treatment, full security and protection, and no less than national and
most-favored nation treatment. The foreign investor is assured of
management authority and control. The terms of commitments
entered into in respect of the foreign investment are to be observed.
If there is a taking by the state of the foreign investment, by means
direct or indirect, the state is treaty bound to pay prompt, adequate,
and effective compensation."'
In essence, there are two different types of standards of
protection in IlAs: Section A will present the relative standards of
treatment such as most-favored nation ("MFN") and national
treatment ("NT"). Section B explores the absolute standards of
treatment, such as fair and equitable treatment ("FET") and full
protection and security ("FPS"). Section C analyzes the prohibition
on expropriation without compensation. Section D looks at the
importance of procedural rules and the role of investment dispute
109. Malicorp Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/18, Award, 116
(Feb. 7, 2011).
110. See, e.-., Fur. Cement Inv. & Trade S.A. v. The Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/07/2, Award, 182-86 (Aug. 13, 2009); Cementonnia 'Nowa Huta" S.A., ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/06/2, Award, 173-78; Libananco Holdings Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Turk.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, Award, 557-69 (Sept. 2, 2011); Mr. Saba Fakes v. Republic of
Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award, 150-55 (July 14, 2010); Rachel S. Grynberg v.
Gren., ICSID Case No. ARB/106, Award, 8.3.1-3.6 (Dec. 10, 2010); Phoenix Action Ltd.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, QQ 148-52.
111. See Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, The Overwhelming Benefits of Bilateral Investment
Treaties, Remarks at Suffolk University Law School (Oct. 31, 2008), in 32 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 263, 265-66 (2009).
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settlement mechanism in the form of international arbitration.
Finally, Section E reviews the remaining classic investment treaties'
provisions which are the limitations on the use of performance
requirements and restrictions on the transfer of funds.11
A. BENEFITS IN TERMS OF CONDITIONS OF COMPETITION:
RELATIVE STANDARDS OF TREATMENT
Countries conclude IIAs primarily for the protection and,
indirectly, the promotion of foreign investment, and increasingly also
for the purpose of liberalization of such investment. IIAs offer
companies and individuals from contracting parties increased security
and certainty under international law when they invest or set up a
business in other countries party to the agreement. The reduction of
the investment risk flowing from an 11A is meant to encourage
companies and individuals to invest in the country that concluded the
h1A. Allowing foreign investors to settle disputes with the host
country through international arbitration, rather than only the host
country's domestic courts, is an important aspect in this context.
Non-discrimination, in the broadest sense, means that the host
country must refrain from discriminatory actions against foreign
investors in general or against specific groups of foreign investors.
Bilateral investment treaties use two different terms in order to
prevent the discriminatory treatment of investments: the MFN clause
and the NT clause. We discuss below the applicability of these two
types of treatment in bilateral treaties.
1. National Treatment
Asian Agricultural Products v. Sri Lanka Dissenting Opinion of
Samuel K.B. Asante, citing various publicists, noted that national
treatment does not derive from customary law.11 3  According to
investment treaties, NT requires that foreign investors are accorded
112. See Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 403, 415 (2006).
113. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No.
ARB/87/3, Dissenting Opinion of Samuel K.B. Asante, 40-41 (June 27, 1990).
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treatment that is no less favorable than that accorded to investors of
the host state.11 4 NT means the obligation of contracting parties to
grant investors of the other contracting party treatment no less
favorable than the treatment they grant to investments of their own
investors. Essentially, NT requires that countries do not discriminate
against foreign investors in favor of domestic investors.15 The
promise of NT in an 11A has to be assumed to be appealing to foreign
investors.1 6 Conversely, some IIAs allow contracting states to have
exceptions to NT in their legislation,1 7 which is relatively less
appealing to foreign investment as the hypothesis for the absence of
the NT provision.1
"No less favorable" does not necessarily mean the same
treatment. NT prohibits both discriminatory treatment expressed in
law (de jure) as well as discriminatory treatment resulting from the
application the law in fact (de facto). Bogdanov v. Moldova IIIFinal
Award noted that discrimination can take many different forms; in
114. Champion Trading Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/(P/9, Award, 128 (stating that national
treatment prohibits discrimination on the grounds of nationality).
115. The standard of treatment can be defined in two ways: "same" or "as favorable as"
treatment or "no less favorable" treatment than the treatment they grant to investments of their
own investors. The difference is subtle, but the "no less favorable" formulation leaves open the
possibility that investors may be entitled to treatment that is more favorable than that accorded
domestic investors, in accordance with international standards. Often the definition of NT is
qualified by the inclusion of the provision that it only applies in "like circumstances" or "similar
circumstances." With the situations of foreign and domestic investors often not being identical,
this language obviously leaves room for interpretation.
116. Agreement Between the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of
Lithuania on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of the Investments, Russ.-Lith., June 29,
1991, see art. 1, para. 1, 2 ("1. Each Contracting Party shall accord in its territory to the
investors, investments made by investors of the other Contracting Party and activities related to
such investments fair and equal treatment ... 2. The treatment, set forth in the paragraph I of
this Article, shall be at least no less favourable than the treatment accorded by the Contracting
Party to the investments and activities related to such investments of its own investors or the
investors of third state.").
117. Agreement Between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government
of the Russian Federation on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Swed.-
Russ., Apr. 19, 1995, art. 3, para. 3 ("Each Contracting Party may have in its legislation limited
exceptions to national treatment provided for in Paragraph (2) of this Article.").
118. An example of the NT obligation is in the US Model BIT. Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-[Country], 2012, art. 3, para. 1. ("Each Party shall
accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like
circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion,
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.")
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the context of the treatment of foreign investments, however, a very
frequent problem is discrimination on the basis of nationality.119
In terms of the benefit of NT to an investor, it offers the investor
a level playing field and protects the investor against discrimination.
Occidental Exploration v. Ecuador Final Award stated that the
purpose of national treatment is to protect investors as compared to
local producers, and this cannot be done by addressing exclusively the
sector in which the particular activity is undertaken.'
However, for host states, it reduces the possibility of favoring
domestic firms, unless exceptions or reservations are expressly
introduced into agreements to allow discrimination as is commonly
done in the case of government procurement, domestic subsidies to
local business or taxation, etc. The U.S. Model BIT creates
exclusions from MEN and NT for these kinds of government actions
in addition to a general exception for security. Host states could also
use a positive list, such that NT is only applicable to sectors covered
in the list and not common to all. The scope of NT in this provision is
limited, though quite broad. It is applicable only to the
"establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct,
operation and sale or other disposition" of investments.
One issue is determining what the appropriate domestic
comparator to the foreign investor is. Arbitration panels in
investment cases have been inconsistent in terms of whether it is
appropriate to interpret the concept of "like circumstances," as in the
provision above, in a manner similar to "like products" under WTO
case law. More recent tribunals have adopted a broader approach.
For example, under a broader concept even a domestic business in
the same economic sector may not be enough to qualify as the
appropriate comparator.
In Bayindir (Turkey) v. Pakistan, Pakistan contested whether the
claimant should be compared to a domestic firm for the purposes of
determining the treatment required under the NT obligation.' 1 This
119. Yuri Bogdanov v. Republic of Moldova, SCC Case No. V091/2012 (Arbitration Institute
of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce), Final Award, I 215-16 (Apr. 16,2013).
120. Occidental Exploration and Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3467
(London Court of International Arbitration), Final Award, 173 (July 1, 2004).
121. Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanavi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, 416 (Aug. 27, 2009).
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issue arose when a claim was launched by the Turkish firm against the
state which terminated a contract for a motorway project and
awarded the work to a consortium of local and foreign companies.
The Turkish firm said that the project it had been hired to do and that
which the consortium was contracted to do were the same work and
hence the complainant and the consortium were in a comparable
situation. As a consequence, Pakistan had favored domestic firms
over foreign investors. However, the tribunal noted that the local
contractors who took over the project did so in a different context
from Bayindir. Whereas the local contractors were given a more
generous time allowance for completing the work, they were also
offered different financial incentives, and had less experience with
projects of this scope. As such, the local contractors could not be
deemed to be in a "similar situation" to Bayindir.' The tribunal
agreed with Pakistan that the "Nature of the Contract" in each case
was different. 3  As a result, no breach of NT was found. The
government's action was a public policy measure that did not
discriminate based on nationality.
Another example of a public policy measure not as
discriminating between a foreign investor and a local business in like
circumstances is a government measure to control environmental
pollution by limiting the use of a particular technology that pollutes.
Even if these measures affect only a foreign investor who uses that
technology and not domestic investors who are not using this
technology, it is likely that the foreign and domestic investor are not
"in like circumstances." The apparent discrimination could be
justified as necessary to achieve a non-discriminatory public policy
objective. The measure does not discriminate based on nationality,
but rather on who pollutes.
Some states may like to limit the scope of NT as it applies to its
sub-regional or sub-federal levels of government. The U.S. Model
Agreement provides with respect to a regional level of government
that the NT obligation is to provide treatment no less favorable than
the treatment accorded in like circumstances, by that regional level of
122. Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanavi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, 389 (Aug. 27, 2009).
123. Id. at 395.
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government, to natural persons resident in and enterprises
constituted under the laws of other regional levels of government of
the party of which it forms a part, and to their respective investments.
A regional level of government is only obliged to give the foreign
investor treatment that it gives to national investors from outside the
region. Finally, discriminatory intent is not relevant in most cases and
it is quite hard to prove.1'
4
2. Most-Favored Na tion Status
Under international law, the usual rule that derives from the
principle of territorial sovereignty allows a state to prohibit the
admission of foreigners and to deny the right to settle within its
territory. This principle is reflected in many international
instruments.'2 5 In other words, under the bilateral investment treaty
classic, the host country has the exclusive authority to decide whether
the investment may be allowed on its territory.
Parkerings v. Lithuania Award discussed the relationship among
MEN, national treatment, and discrimination, noting that
differentiated treatment must be objectively justified. 1-2 6 So, the MFN
standard establishes, at least in principle, a level playing field between
all foreign investors. The MEN treatment requires that a government
does not discriminate among foreign investors from different
124. See supra note 122, at 390 ("If the requirement of a similar situation is met, the
Tribunal must further inquire whether Bayindir was granted less favourable treatment than
other investors. This raises the question whether the test is subjective or objective, i.e. whether
an intent to discriminate is required or whether a showing of discrimination of an investor who
happens to be a foreigner is sufficient. The Tribunal considers that the second solution is the
correct one.").
125. Most countries are reluctant to grant to nationals and foreign companies an unqualified
right to make investments in their territories, and for various reasons. Countries are often
reluctant to admit foreign control of the most important means of production. Some countries
may be concerned about the issue of foreign ownership in industries that are essential to
national security, while other countries may be interested in foreign ownership on industries of
particular importance in the development effort or that have a value and a special cultural
significance. In other cases, domestic firms may require protection against foreign competition.
The result is that many countries impose restrictions or conditions on the entry of foreign direct
investment in specific industries. For these reasons, in general, a bilateral treaty does not give
investors the right to make in the territory of the other contracting party.
126. Parkerings-Compagniet v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award,
366-71 (Sept. 11, 2007).
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countries. Unlike NT, all these IIAs include, at least in principle, the
MEN standard.' 7 MEN treatment does not require the host country
to treat enterprises in different sectors or in different "situations" or
"circumstances" in the same way; however, again there is a difficulty
in determining what constitutes a "like circumstance." 128
A first option consists of a drafting which gives the MEN a broad
scope of application.>'9 This first option is expected to be relatively
more favorable to foreign investments. Conversely, restrictions are
considered relatively less appealing to foreign investments. A second
option limits the scope of the MEN clause through the inclusion of
different possible restrictions. In order to identify these limitations,
three issues can be raised: first, when there is a limited set of
activities; 13 second, whether the MEN clause applies to third treaties
127. BITs commonly provide that MFN treatment shall not apply so as to require that
investors be given the same benefits as may be given to investors under the terms of customs
unions, free trade zones, economic unions and the like. That provision ensures that the BIT
does not become an impediment to regional economic integration. See Agreement Between the
Government of Hong Kong and the Government of the Republic of Austria for the Promotion
and Protection of Investments, H.K.-Austria, art. 4, Oct. 11, 1996 (MFN obligations shall not
apply so as to require the host State to match any benefits resulting from any arrangements
"designed to lead in future" to a regional customs, monetary, tariff or trade arrangement, or
from any arrangement with any third state in the region "designed to promote regional
cooperation in the economic, social, labor, industrial or monetary fields within the framework of
specific projects").
128. On the difficulties and controversies provoked by the extension of jurisdiction via MEN
clauses, see generally Julie A. Maupin, MLEN-BasedJuris&ction in Investor-State Arbitration: Is
There An vHope for a Consistent Approach?, 14 J. INT'L ECON. L. 157 (2011) (examining the
difficulties and controversies provoked by the extension of jurisdiction via MEN clauses).
129. Emilio Agustin Maffezini, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award, 38 ("In all matters
subject to this Agreement, this treatment shall be no less favourable than that extended by each
Party to the investments made in its territory by investors of a third country.").
130. Any limited set leads us to take the clause as narrow. Some MFN clauses, specifically
those applying to pre-establishment, link the treatment to a limited set of activities (sometimes
for both investors and investments or only for investments). See United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, New York, U.S. and Geneva, Switz., Nov. 2010, Mlost-Favoured
Nation Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements I at
5, UNCTAD/DIAEIA/2010I/1 ("Each Country shall accord to investors of the other Country
and to their investments treatment no less favourable than that it accords in like circumstances
to investors of a third State and to their investments, with respect to investment activities.
Investment activities' being defined as 'establishment, acquisition, expansion, management,
operation, maintenance, use, possession, liquidation, sale, or other disposition of
investments."'); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New York, U.S. and
Geneva, Switz., Dec. 1999, Mlost-Favoured Nation Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in
International Investment Agreements , at 12, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/10 (Vol. III) (The right of
establishment ensures that "a foreign investor, whether a natural or legal person, has the right
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providing for substantial liberalization of investment; 13  and, third,
whether the MIFN applies to the investment only (and not to the
*132investor). 3-
An import of substantive standards of protection was allowed in
Bayindir, where the FET standard in the Pakistan-Switzerland BIT
was allowed to be imported because it was considered more favorable
than the Pakistan-Turkey BIT, which did not contain such a
provision.
The main issue with using a MFN provision in a treaty to import
standards from other treaties is that it could threaten the stability and
coherence of obligations. The inclusion of a MEN clause in a new
to enter the host country and set up an office, agency, branch or subsidiary (as the case may be),
possibly subject to limitations justified on grounds of national security, public health and safety
or other public policy grounds.").
131. Some treaties indeed regulate potential interaction with third treaties as to preserve the
arrangements entered into under the base treaty. For example, the Japan-Switzerland EPA 2009
establishes that the MFN clause does not apply to third treaties providing for substantial
liberalization of investment. If such liberalization does occur, it would be subject to consultation
with a view of incorporating it into the base treaty. For instance, the Most-Favoured-Nation
Treatment of the Japan-Switzerland EPA reads in Article 88 that: "If a Party accords more
favourable treatment to investors of a non-Party and their investments by concluding or
amending a free trade agreement, customs union or similar agreement that provides for
substantial liberalization of investment, it shall not be obliged to accord such treatment to
investors of the other Party and their investments. Any such treatment accorded by a Party shall
be notified to the other Party without delay and the former Party shall endeavour to accord to
investors of the latter Party and their investments treatment no less favourable than that
accorded under the concluded or amended agreement. The former Party, upon request by
thelatter Party, shall enter into negotiations with a view to incorporating into this Agreement
treatment no less favourable than that accorded under such concluded or amended agreement."
Agreement on Free Trade and Economic Partnership Between Swiss Confederation and Japan,
Switz.-Jap., art. 88, para. 3, Sept. 1, 2009.
132. Some BITs provide that MFN treatment applies only to investment. For example, the
BITs between China on the one hand, and Cambodia, Qatar, and Brunei Darussalam,
respectively, on the other hand. Some of China's earlier BITs are limited in scope and cover
only investments in their MEN Clause, without direct reference to "investment-related
activities." See Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments, China-Swed., art. 1, Mar.
29, 1982. Some IhAs cover only investments. There may be measures affecting the investor but
not the investment; for example, a discriminatory entry or operational barrier applicable only to
foreigners. This would have the consequence of excluding foreign individuals or companies
from the MEN standard and limiting it to subsidiaries constituted or assets acquired under the
legislation of the host state. This has been a common approach for countries like China and
Australia. The Australia-Uruguay BIT serves a good example as its Article 4 defines MEN as:
"Each Party shall at all times treat investments in its own territory on a basis no less favourable
than that accorded to investments of investors of any third country .... Agreement Between
Australia and Uruguay on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.-Uru., art. 4,
Mar. 9.20(02.
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treaty may lead to the importation of provisions from old treaties.
Similarly, obligations agreed to in new treaties could be imported into
old treaties with MEN clauses. How is it possible to avoid this
applicability'? One way is to include exceptions and specific
reservations in new treaties. Such treaties could also limit the scope
of activities for applicability of MFN clauses by using a clause like the
U.S. Model MEN, clause which is limited to specific activities.
1 33
The most important issue recently has been to what extent MEN
in a treaty allows for the import of a standard from another treaty,
which was not agreed between the two states contesting a dispute. In
one case, it was argued by an Argentinean investor that the dispute
settlement procedure in the Spain-Chile BIT was more favorable than
the procedure agreed between Argentina and Spain, and therefore,
the investor should be able to take advantage of the procedure
because of the MFN clause in the Argentina-Spain BIT. The BIT
between Spain and Argentina required an eighteen month delay
before a claim could be made under the treaty, whereas in the BIT
between Spain and Chile, there was no such requirement. The
tribunal agreed with Argentina partly on the basis that, at the time of
negotiations of the BIT, the eighteen month condition had been
sought by Argentina and it was not usually included in Spain's
treaties, as was evidenced by the agreement with Chile. It supported
its conclusion by noting that the overall goal of IlAs is to have
favorable conditions for investment. This decision of the tribunal in
Maffezini permits claimants to cherry-pick the most favorable
standards from other treaties.
133. We could also use a provision like the Canadian Model which contains an extensive
carve-out from the MEN obligation. Annex III to Canada's Model FIPA ("Exceptions from
Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment") provides as follows: "I. Article 4 [MEN] shall not apply to
treatment accorded under all bilateral or multilateral international agreements in force or
signed prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement. 2. Article 4 shall not apply to
treatment by a Party pursuant to any existing or future bilateral or multilateral agreement: (a)
Establishing, strengthening or expanding a free trade area or customs union; (b) Relating to: (i)
aviation; (ii) fisheries; (iii) maritime matters, including salvage. 3. For greater certainty, Article
4 shall not apply to any current or future foreign aid programme to promote economic
development, whether under a bilateral agreement, or pursuant to a multilateral arrangement or
agreement, such as the OECD Agreement on Export Credits." Agreement Between Canada
and [Country] for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can., Annex III, 2004
[hereinafter Canadian FIPA Model].
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B. BENEFITS IN TERMS OF RESPECT OF THE RULE OF LAW: THE FAIR
AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT
IIAs usually include one or several general principles intended to
provide overall criteria by which to judge whether the treatment
given to an investment is satisfactory.134 The absolute standards
found are the international minimum standard of treatment, fair and
equitable treatment and full protection and security. 35
The FET is the most important (in theory and practice 36) of
those general principles.1 37 Continental Casualty v. Argentina Award
found that fair and equitable treatment is especially important for
direct investments which are usually made for a considerable duration
and whose profitability and economic contribution to the host
country's economy are dependent on them being treated by local
authorities in a way which is coherent with the ordinary conduct of
business activity.1 3 Also, Suez, Barcelona and Interagua v. Argentina
observed that: (a) it is a vaguely and ambiguously defined standard,
the scope of which is not defined in BITs; (b) it is a standard widely
used in hundreds of BITs worldwide; (c) the terms defining the
standard are flexible and apply to all types of investments and
ventures; (d) it is a factual standard because its implementation is
closely linked to the particular facts of each case so that judgment
about what is fair and equitable cannot be formulated in the abstract
but depends on the particular facts of the case; and (e) its extensive
use in BITs, generality, and flexibility suggest that this is a standard
developed by the contracting States as the basic standard of treatment
134. See Nicolas Angelet, Fair and Equitable Treatment, in 3 MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1094, 1095 (Rudiger Wolfrum et al. eds., 2012).
135. ADF Group Inc. v. U.S. Award found that any general requirement to accord "Fair and
Equitable Treatment" and "full protection and security" must be disciplined by being based
upon State practice and judicial or arbitral case law or other sources of customary or general
international law. ADF Group Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award, 184 (Jan.
9,2003).
136. See generally Catherine Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in
International Investment La w (OECD Working Papers on International Investment, Paper No.
2004/03, 2004), available athttp://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2004_3.pdf.
137. See Stephen Vasciannie, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International
InvestmentLaw andPractice, 70 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 99, 102-05 (1999).
138. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 254 (Sept.
5, 2008).
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they are obliged to mutually grant to foreign investments protected
under the BITs.139 In the same vein, Total v. Argentina Decision on
Liability noted that the undertaking of the host country to provide
fair and equitable treatment to the investors of the other party and
their investments is a standard feature in BITs, although the exact
language of such undertakings is not uniform, and the generality of
the fair and equitable treatment standard distinguishes it from
specific obligations undertaken by the parties to a BIT. 40
This standard is not totally new, but it has been extensively
applied since only 2000.141 It however lacks sufficient clarification.
According to some, the vagueness surrounding this standard is
intentional, in order to give arbitrators a certain amount of
discretion.14 2 The clauses providing foreign investment with FET are
widespread in IIAs.143  Thus, FET offers high protection when
included in treaties. The FET favors FDI flows, while no FET might
be less encouraging.
144
FET is considered a minimum standard of treatment. It is
included in the vast majority of investment treaties. This is the
provision most commonly invoked in dispute settlement and it is the
basis of most successful claims. It has a broad scope and is an open-
textured standard that is very hard to apply in practice.
139. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability, 180-81 (July 30, 2010).
140. Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability,
106 (Dec. 27, 2010).
141. See Michele Potesta, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law.:
Understan&ig the Roots and the Limits of a Controversial Concept, 28 ICSID REV. 88, 91
(2013).
142. See Stephen Fietta, Expropriation and the Fair and Equitable' Standard- The
Developing Role of Investors 'Expectations' in International Investment Arbitration, 23 J.
INT'L ARB. 375, 398 (2006).
143. See, e.., German Model Investment Protection Treaty, Ger., art. 2, para. 2, 2008
("Each Contracting State shall ... accord investments by investors . . . fair and equitable
treatment as well as full protection under the Treaty."); Agreement between Australia and the
Republic of Hungary on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.-Hung.,
art. 3, para. 2, Aug. 15, 1991 ("A Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment in
its own territory to investments.").
144. See Rudolf Dolzer, Contemporarij Law of Foreign Investment. Revisiting the Status of
InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 818, 824-25 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009).
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There are different ways to express it. Some treaties express it as
a combination of FET with "full protection and security" and/or
"general principles of International Law." Some others follow the
U.S. Model and limit FET only to Customary International Law
("CIL"). There is general consensus that it is a minimum standard of
treatment for dealing with foreign investors, but as yet there is no
consensus on what the standard requires. That is one reason why
some treaties try to limit it to CIL. If it is not limited to CIL, then it
would represent an autonomous standard. However, whether limited
by CIL or an autonomous standard, the final interpretation is subject
to the specific language used in the treaty.14s
In some cases, tribunals have adopted a broader view of the
standard, such as interpreting FET as requiring states to act in
compliance with the legitimate expectations of investors. Legitimate
expectations may be based on or linked to three different elements:
First, the necessary compliance with contracts; second, the legal
regime at the time of the investment; and third, the general
expectations of the foreign corporation.
Firstly, while compliance with contracts is a reasonable
expectation, tribunals have held that not all breaches of contracts are
breaches of FET. If a state acting in its sovereign capacity completely
repudiated a contract, that action could be a breach of FET, but if a
state terminated simply on the grounds of a commercial dispute, that
would not be a breach of FET. For example, in Waste Management
v. IUnited Mexican States,46 a U.S. investor had a contract in Mexico
for the collection of garbage. The city administration terminated the
contract. Was it a breach of FET? The tribunal found that state acted
145. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/O0/3, Award,
(Apr. 30, 2004). Taken together, the S.D. Alvers, Mlondev, ADFand Loewen cases suggest that
the minimum standard of treatment of fair and equitable treatment is infringed by conduct
attributable to the State and harmful to the claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair,
unjust or idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial
prejudice, or involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial
propriety-as might be the case with a manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings
or a complete lack of transparency and candour in an administrative process. In applying this
standard, it is relevant that the treatment is in breach of representations made by the host State
which were reasonably relied on by the claimant. Id. at Q 98. See also Eric van Eyken, Fair and
Equitable in CETA - Finallv Defined?, YOUNG ICCA BLOG (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.young
icca-blog.com/fair-and-equitable-in-ceta-finally-defined/.
146. Waste Azmt Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award.
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only as commercial entity by terminating the contract due to the poor
performance by the investor. Hence the tribunal did not find a
violation of the FET obligation.
Secondly, investors have a reasonable expectation that the state
will ensure that its rules are stable, predictable, and transparent.
States must still have scope and freedom to respond to appropriate
changes in policy measures as per the requirement of the domestic
regime (e.g., in a democratic system, newly elected governments are
under tremendous public pressure to make changes to polices already
in place). The investor-state arbitration tribunals have not been
consistent regarding the degree of flexibility permitted.
Thirdly, foreign corporations have a reasonable expectation that
a state will be consistent and coherent in its application of law,
comply with due process, and act in good faith. An example of a
broad conception of the FET standard can be seen in paragraph 133
of Tdcnicas Medioambien tales Tecmed v. United Mexican States, a
case decided under the Spain-Mexico BIT:
[T]o provide to international investments treatment that does not
affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the
foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign investor
expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from
ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign
investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and
regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of
the relevant policies and administrative practices or directives, to
be able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations.
The foreign investor also expects the host State to act consistently,
i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any preexisting decisions or permits
issued by the State that were relied upon by the investor to assume
its commitments as well as to plan and launch its commercial and
business activities .... 147
Such a broad-based FET is very protective of investors, and
subsequently this approach was followed in many cases. FET as a
minimum standard of treatment is generally not subject to exceptions
or reservations.
147. Tcnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, 154 (May 29, 2003).
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As a minimum standard of treatment, there is a general
consensus that the standard requires at least that the state not engage
in bad faith, arbitrary treatment of investors, willful neglect of the
interest of investors, or clearly unreasonable treatment of investors.
148
Good faith requires that the state does not act with an intention to
injure an investor. In Bayindir, it was alleged by the Turkish claimant
in its case against Pakistan, regarding the termination of a motorway
construction contract, that the cancellation of the contract and the
award of the work to a consortium with domestic companies was not
in good faith because the action was not based on problems with the
claimant's work but on the intention to confer a benefit on a
consortium of local businesses. 149 As a minimum standard, the state
must treat investors in accordance with due process and exercise due
diligence to prevent harm to investors. Due process includes
requirements in administrative actions, like proper notice of
government actions that affect an investor. Similarly, the state is
under an obligation not to deny justice. Denial of justice is not any
action of the courts deciding against investors, but rather involves a
denial of a right to go to court, to refuse to entertain a claim, undue
delay in judgment or the administration of justice in a deficient way,
and clear misapplication of law. Sometimes the denial of justice is
quite evident, such as in The Loewen Group v. US., where in civil
judicial proceedings, a U.S. lawyer for the plaintiff made
discriminatory remarks regarding the foreign defendant, effectively
making the dispute a racial issue.50 The court failed to prevent the
lawyer from making these prejudicial arguments and very substantial
punitive damages were awarded against the defendant investor as a
result.
148. Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GmbH v. Ukraine finds that fair and
equitable treatment is not limited to the standard required by customary international law.
ICSID Case No. ARB/08/8, Excerpts of Award, 265 (Mar. 1, 2012). There is no requirement
that the conduct be gross or shocking; a government act could be unfair or inequitable if it is in
breach of specific commitments, if it is undertaken for political reasons or other improper
motives, if the investor is not treated in an objective, even-handed, unbiased, and transparent
way, or for other reasons. Id.
149. Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, 416 (Aug. 27, 2009).
150. The Loewen Group, Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Final Award, 149
(June 26, 2003).
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In Glamis Gold v. US., a 2009 case involving the minimum
standard of treatment in NAFTA, which is tied to CIL, the tribunal
described the standard, as ". . . a violation of the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment,""1 as codified in
Article 1105 of the NAFTA, requires an act that is sufficiently
egregious and shocking-a gross denial of justice, manifest
arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process,
evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons-so as to fall
below accepted international standards and constitute a breach of
Article 1105. Such a breach may be exhibited by a "gross denial of
justice or manifest arbitrariness falling below acceptable international
standards, 15 2 or the creation by the state of objective expectations in
order to induce investment and the subsequent repudiation of those
expectations. The tribunal interpreted NAFTA Article 1105 to set a
very high standard for FET claims that involves more than just a
denial of justice. Applying this standard, the tribunal rejected a claim
by a Canadian investor in the mining sector arising out of an action by
the State of California to require the investor to back-fill a mine. This
was a very strict view of the standard.
C. BENEFITS AGAINST EXPROPRIATION
Historically, the direct taking of foreign property was one of the
most significant risks to foreign investors.15 3  Metalclad v. Mexico
Award set out a general definition of expropriation:
[It] includes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of
property, such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer
of title in favour of the host State, but also covert or incidental
interference with the use of property which has the effect of
depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or
151. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. U.S., UCSID, Final Award, 627 (June 8, 2009).
152. Id.
153. See Patrick M. Norton, A Laiw of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals
and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 474, 493-95 (1991) (on the
history of expropriation in international law); John H. Herz, Expropriation of Foreign Propertv,
35 AM. J. INT'L L. 243, 251 (1941); see generallv G. C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of
Properti under International Law?, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 307 (1962) (providing an overview of
various decisions on expropriation).
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reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not
necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State.1
54
So, outright takings are now considered rare in most parts of the
world. However, another form of taking, referred to as indirect
expropriation, has become increasingly important.1 55  If traditional
international investment protection law was aimed at direct
expropriations (towards the taking of a foreign investor's assets),
indirect expropriations (deprivations) have become a part of
international legal investment protection rules and are in practice an
important cause of treaty violations.
1 56
Indirect expropriation can be illustrated by several treaties.
Although the specific wording may vary, most expropriation clauses
have continued with the traditional approach of extending protection
to those measures of the host country that may have an effect
equivalent to expropriation or are tantamount to expropriation (other
agreements use the term "indirect expropriations") .57 Some treaties
154. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award,
103 (Aug. 30, 2000).
155. See Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Propertr b the State: Recent Developments in
International Lawi 176 RECUEIL DES COURS 259, 388-89 (1982). See also Julien Chaisse,
Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union Polici on Foreign Investment-How g711 the New
EU Competence on EDI Affect the Emerging Global Regime, 15, J. OF INT'L ECON. L., 51-84
(2012).
156. Indirect expropriations fall short of actual physical taking of property, but result in the
effective loss of management, use or control, or a significant depreciation of the value of the
assets of a foreign investor. There is, however, no clear definition of indirect expropriation.
Despite a number of decisions of international tribunals, the line between the concept of
indirect expropriation and governmental regulatory measures not requiring compensation has
not been clearly articulated and depends on the specific facts and circumstances of the case. Of
course, although there are some variations in the way some arbitral tribunals have distinguished
legitimate noncompensable regulations having an effect on the economic value of foreign
investments and indirect expropriation requiring compensation, examination reveals that, in
broad terms, they have identified the following criteria which look very similar to the ones laid
out by the recent agreements: (i) the degree of interference with the property right; (ii) the
character of governmental measures, i.e., the purpose and the context of the governmental
measure; and (iii) the interference of the measure with reasonable and investment-backed
expectations. See Anne Van Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment and
Flexibilitu A Contract Theory Analisis, 12 J. INT'L ECON. L. 507, 510-12 (2009).
157. For example, treaties entered by France refer to: "measures of expropriation or
nationalization or any other measures the effect of which would be direct or indirect
dispossession." Some UK treaties provide that expropriation also covers measures "having
effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation." Other treaties, such as some of those
concluded by Sweden, refer to "any direct or indirect measure" or "any other measure having
the same nature or the same effect against investments." The former United States Model BIT
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do not mention the case for indirect expropriation; neither do they
imply its coverage by the treaty. 1s8
Every state has the right to expropriate, so long as it is for a
public purpose (e.g., road or rail construction), not arbitrary or
discriminatory (applicable to both foreign and domestic investors), in
accordance with procedural due process (i.e., in accordance with basic
standards of fair procedure, proper notice, and access to a process to
challenge the expropriation), and accompanied by adequate
compensation. s9 These requirements are generally expressed either
in CIL or national laws, and the only issues are what state actions
constitute expropriation and what is the standard for compensation.
There are two kinds of expropriation. Direct: This form of
expropriation is relatively clear. It occurs when a state takes over an
investor's property. Indirect: Some sort of government action, other
than which substantially affects an investor's ability to use its
mentions "measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization." Several United States
treaties are more specific on these measures: "any other measure or series of measures, direct or
indirect, tantamount to expropriation (including the levying of taxation, the compulsory sale of
all or part of an investment, or the impairment or deprivation of its management, control of
economic value .... )." Julien Chaisse & Christian Bellak, Navigating the Expanding Universe
of International Treaties on Foreign Investment. Creation and Use of a Critical Index, 18 J.
INT'L. ECON. L. 79, 94 n.51 (2015).
158. In this regard, Italy does not cover indirect expropriation in any of its IhAs, whereas the
UK has dealt with it in only a few of them. Our hypothesis is that since most IhAs contain brief
and general indirect expropriation provisions which focus on the effect of the government
action, this has to be attractive to foreign investors. Conversely, when some IhAs do not protect
investors against indirect expropriation, the effect expected on economic FDI flows is likely to
be relatively weaker. See M. Sornarajah, A Coming Crisis: EApansionarl Trends in Investment
Treaty Arbitration, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DisPuTEs 39
(Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2008); Ari Afilalo, Towards a Common Law of International Investment.
How NAFTA Chapter 11 Panels Should Solve Their Legitimacv Crisis, 17 GEO. INT'L ENVTL.
L. REV. 51 (2004); Charles N. Brower, A Crisis of Legitimacv, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 7, 20(P-, at B9;
Charles N. Brower et al., The Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudication Sistem, 19 ARB. INT'L
415 (2003); Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the
Legitimaciv of International Investment Lar?, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 471 (2009); Susan D. Franck,
The Lesdtimacv Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law
through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005).
159. See, e.g., Compaia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica,
ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award, 72 (Feb. 17, 2000) (Paragraph 72 of the award reads:
"Expropriatory environmental measures- no matter how laudable and beneficial to society as a
whole -are in this respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures that a state may take in
order to implement its policies: where property is expropriated, even for environmental
purposes, whether domestic or international, the state's obligation to pay compensation
remains.").
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property, but there is no formal transfer of property to the state. It is
less clear when an indirect expropriation has taken place.
Regarding indirect expropriations, IIAs must balance between a
state's rights to regulate for legitimate reasons without having to
compensate an investor's loss as a result of any such regulation and
protecting an investor against losing substantial benefits of its
property.16 0 The treaty needs to address the issue whether, as a result
of government regulation (even if it was a bona fide regulation for
public purpose), it could be considered an "indirect expropriation"
and trigger an obligation to pay compensation if it had a substantial
deprivation effect to an investor.161  The answer from arbitral cases is
inconsistent.1 62 From a normative perspective, there is also a
significant discrepancy across treaties.1 63
160. Andrew Newcombe views that the assessment of police power regulation that involves
the destruction of the investment must involve some assessment of necessity and
proportionality. See Andrew Newcombe, The Boundaries of Regulatorv Expropriation in
International Lawr, 20(1) ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 1, 30-1 (2005). Also, some
commentators seem inclined to support using the proportionality approach to tobacco control
measures. See generalli Faraz Rojid et al., No Coverage for Tobacco Industries ifith Regard to
Tobacco-Control M-easures-The Future of International Investment Agreements, 9(5)
TRANSNAT'L Disp. MGMT. J. 4 (2012).
161. See generalli Caroline Henckels, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate:
Revisiting Proportionality Analisis and the Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitration,
15 J. INT'L ECON. L. 223 (2012). On the application of minimal standards of treatment to a
variety of specific defenses under earlier U.S. Model BITs, see Patrick Dumberry, The Quest to
Define 'Fair and Equitable Treatment -for Investors Under International La if: The Case of the
NAFTA Chapter 11 Pope & Talbot A irards, 3 J. WORLD INV. 657, 663 (2002). See also
Catherine Yannaca-Small, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Fair and Equitable
Treatment Standard in International Investment Law (Working Papers on International
Investment, OECD Working Paper No. 2004/3, 2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/
daf/inv/internationalinvestmentagreements/33776498.pdf. On the disparate application of the
"fair and equitable treatment" standard by ISA tribunals, see, e.-., Maffezini, supra note 129
(the "fair and equitable" treatment standard is uniform in international investment
jurisprudence; rather the contrary is evident in a series of cases commencing with the ICSID
award); MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award (May
25, 2004).
162. See Campbell McLachlan, Investment Treaties and General International Lair, 57
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 361, 363 (2008) (discussing tribunals reaching opposite conclusions on the
same issue); Margrete Stevens, The ICSID Convention and the Origins of Investment Treaty
Arbitration, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2009)
(describing international investment law as a coherent system since the inception of the ICSID
Convention).
163. See Joel C. Beauvais, Note, Regulatorv Expropriations Under NAFTA: Emerging
Principles and Lingering Doubts, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 245, 248 (2002) (reviewing regulatory
takings cases and finding that NAFTA tribunals have approached the doctrine "relatively
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The discussion of expropriation cannot be complete without
addressing the issue of the correct compensation standard. 164  One
common way in which the standard is expressed is prompt (without
delay), effective (referring to the form in which it is paid which
means, generally, a convertible currency), and adequate (fair market
value, book value, or sometimes accounting value).165
The other way advocated by some developing countries is
appropriate or equitable compensation. This is generally understood
to represent a lower standard which takes into account the host
country's ability to pay. Investors may not like this definition on the
basis that it is less certain and less likely to fully compensate them for
their loss. Another issue is whether damages should be reduced if an
conservatively, placing significant limitations on the scope of government regulation subject to
it"); Rahim Moloo & Justin Jacinto, Environmental and Health Regulation: Assessinbg Liability
Under Investment Treaties, 29 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 24 (describing the standard in practice
for finding a regulatory expropriation). For instance, the Canadian FIPA Model describes
expressly what an indirect expropriation is. The Canadian Model states that an indirect
expropriation is a measure or a series of measures that have an effect equivalent to direct
expropriation, followed by details of a list of the factors to be considered. The parties confirm
their shared understanding that: (a) indirect expropriation results from a measure or series of
measures of a party that have an effect equivalent to direct expropriation without a formal
transfer of title or an outright seizure; (b) the determination of whether a measure or series of
measures of a party constitute an indirect expropriation requires a case-by-case, fact-based
inquiry that considers, among other factors: (i) the economic impact of the measure or series of
measures, although the sole fact that a measure or series of measures of a party has an adverse
effect on the economic value of an investment does not establish that an indirect expropriation
has occurred; (ii) the extent to which the measure or series of measures interfere with distinct,
reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the measure or series of
measures; (c) except in rare circumstances, such as when a measure or series of measures are so
severe in the light of their purpose that they cannot be reasonably viewed as having been
adopted and applied in good faith, nondiscriminatory measures of a party that are designed and
applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation. See Canadian FIPA Model, supra note
133, at Annex B.13(I).
164. AIG v. Kazakhstan holds that, although there is much disagreement as to the
appropriate standard of compensation, customary international law has consistently recognized
that the expropriation of a foreign investor's property, including contract rights, must be
accompanied by "compensation"- the traditional standard being that such compensation be
adequate in amount, be paid promptly, and be effective in the manner and form of its payment
to recompense the owner for the loss of the property or investment. AIG Capital Partners, Inc.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/6, Award, 12.1.3.
165. Fuchs v. Georgia, citing Vivendi Award, holds that where the BIT is silent on the
standard of compensation, Article 36 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility indicates that
the level of damages awarded in international investment arbitration is supposed to be sufficient
to compensate the affected party fully and to eliminate the consequences of the state's action.
Ron Fuchs v. Geor., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/15, Award, 532-34 (Mar. 3, 2010).
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investor has not taken steps to mitigate its loss. The last thing to
address is whether this obligation of compensation for expropriation
should be subject to reservation or exceptions. It may be argued on
the investor's side that, where there has been an expropriation, some
obligation to compensate is required.
D. DIsPuT SETTLEMENT IN IIAs
In order to ensure proper respect and conformity with
investment rules regarding protected foreign investments, investment
treaties provide various dispute-resolution mechanisms, "one of the
most important of which is international investor-state arbitration
which entitles an injured investor to sue the host government for
damages because of a violation of treaty standards and rights." 166 Gas
Natural v. Argentina Decision on Jurisdiction considered that a
crucial element of investment treaties-indeed perhaps the most
crucial element-has been the provision for independent
international arbitration of disputes between investors and host
states. 
167
On the basis of these provisions, disputes between an investor
and a host state are settled by international arbitration rather than by
the domestic courts of the host state (as would be the case
otherwise). 168 The host government's consent to the jurisdiction of an
international arbitration tribunal is granted ex ante in the form of an
open offer in either the investment treaty or in its national law.169 In a
166. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerin g Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 427, 446 (2010). See also Olivia Chung, The Lopsided International Investment Law
Regime and Its Effect on the Future of Investor-State Arbitration, 47 VAND J. INT'L L. 958, 960
(2007); Zachary Douglas, The Hbrid Foundations of Investment Treatr Arbitration, 74 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 151, 184-289 (2003) (discussing the choice of law problems related to jurisdictional
conflicts between tribunals established by treaties, and those constituted pursuant contract);
Joachim Pohl et al., Dispute Settlement Provisions in International Investment Agreements: A
Large Sample Survey (OECD Investment Division, OECD Working Paper on International
Investment, Working Paper No. 2012/2, 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/invest
ment/workingpapers.
167. Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision
of the Tribunal on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction, 29-31 (June 17, 2005).
168. See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacv Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
Pivatizinbg Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
1521, 1525 (2005).
169. See Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility;" Explaine Resistance to Interstate
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few years, investment disputes brought before international
arbitrators have multiplied and have raised attention by reason of the
significant compensations host states have had to pay in some
instances."O An ISD mechanism is an incentive to invest because it
provides as an ultimate resort access to international (neutral)
jurisdiction.7
There are two different kinds of dispute settlement procedures in
IIAs: state-to-state dispute settlement and investor-state fispute
("ISD") Settlement.
1. State-to-State Dispute Settlement
Most IIAs have established a process to address disputes
between states, regarding the "interpretation or application" of the
treaty. However, these procedures have rarely been used.1 73 The
major issue is whether the scope of the procedures covers all
provisions in IhAs or whether it excludes some of them. Most state-
Dispute Resolution Alechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 304 (2002); but cf Andrew T.
Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theori of International La if- 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1861-63
(2002) (arguing that the reputational cost of a violation of international law depends on several
factors, including the extent to which other states know of the violation).
170. One notable example is the case of CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech Republic, a
UNCITRAL arbitration under the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT, which resulted in an
award and payment of $355 million to an injured investor, one of the largest awards ever made
in an arbitration proceeding. CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL
Arbitration Proceedings, Final Award, 371 (Mar. 14, 2003).
171. The Austria-Hong Kong agreement provides for a relatively broad scope of application
of investor-state dispute settlement procedures without any condition: "any dispute . ..
concerning an investment." Agreement Between the Government of Hong Kong and the
Government of the Republic of Austria for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, supra
note 127, at art. 9. This approach is by far the most common in all IhAs. See Ian A. Laird,
Interpretation in International In vestment Arbitration -Through the Looking Glass, in A LIBER
AMICORUM: THOMAS WALDE - LAW BEYOND CONVENTIONAL THOUGHT 151 (Jacques
Werner & Arif Hyder Ali eds., 2009).
172. See Michele Potesta, State-to-State Dispute Settlement Pursuant to Bilateral
Investment Treaties. Is there Potential?, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF TULLIO TREVES 753 (Nerina Boschiero et al.
eds., 2013). See also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the
United States, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 201, 265 (1988) (describing the 1983 draft's state-to-state
dispute provisions).
173. See Mahnoush H. Arsanjani & W. Michael Reisman, Interpreting Treaties for the
Benefit of Third Parties: The "Salvors' Doctrine" and the Use of Legislative History in
Investment Treaties, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 597, 603-04 (2010).
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to-state procedures cover all IIA obligations, but some contain
exclusions. 174
The current U.S. Model BIT, for example, excludes the
provisions regarding the maintenance of labor and environmental
standards. Typically, state-to-state procedures require prior
consultation between the states and then arbitration procedures in
case there is no amicable solution after consultation.175 This state-to-
state mechanism at least offers a platform to developing countries and
less developed countries ("LDCs") to require a developed country to
engage with them regarding issues of interpretation. Arbitration
procedures have not been traditionally transparent. Proceedings,
notifications, and decisions have often not been made public.
2. Investor-State Dispute Settlement
This is a particular feature of IIAs which differentiates them
from all other type of treaties. 7 6 Investors from one party state are
permitted to seek financial compensation from the other party state
through binding arbitration on the grounds that the other party state
has failed to comply with its obligations under the treaty.1 77 Investor-
state dispute settlement fulfills investors' needs in many ways. First,
it avoids exposure of the investor to the uncertainties of host state
laws and regulations by creating a separate treaty-based set of rules to
govern host state conduct.178 Second, it gives investors an alternative
to the host state judicial system to seek relief from host state actions.
174. Pohl et al., supra note 166.
175. See Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hbrid Theory of
Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authorit, 5D HARV. INT'L ECON. L.J. 1, 68-70
(2014) (concluding "that investment treaty rights are granted to investors and home states on an
interdependent basis, and interpretive authority is shared between the treaty parties, investor-
state tribunals, and state-to-state tribunals.").
176. Laird, supra note 171, at 157 (noting the "constant pressure that exists in investor-state
arbitration between the fundamentally state-based system" and rights of individual investors
under investment treaties).
177. See Megan Wells Sheffer, Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Friend or Foe to Human
Riszhts?, 39 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POLY 483, 484 (2011) (describing how MNC-investors'
bargaining power is strengthened by BITs because these instruments provide them with
minimum standards of protection).
178. See Stephen E. Blythe, The Advantages of Investor-State Arbitration as a Dispute
Resolution Alechanism in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 47 INT'L LAW. 273, 275 (2013).
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Third, an investor can determine when there has been a breach of a
treaty obligation and launch a claim.179 Finally, it is unnecessary for
an investor to rely on its home state espousing its claim-there may
be various reasons why a state may not want to make a claim against
another state in diplomatic relations.
Simultaneously, committing to ISD settlement could have
advantages for a host state for at least three reasons. Firstly, it sends
a positive signal to investors that it is committed to offering a
predictable and secure investment regime. Secondly, it creates an
incentive to develop domestic polices favorable to attracting new
investment and maintaining ongoing investment, including policies
that are predictable, certain, and transparent. Finally, it locks in pro-
investment, market-opening reform by making it difficult to change
domestic policy.
The system is however not perfect. The disadvantages for host
states include the fact that in investor-state arbitration, investors
pursue only their commercial interests and do not bother about host
state policy goals or the public interest. This is not like state-to-state
dispute settlement, where states may apply restraint with respect to
pursuing claims. For example, states may not pursue an investor's
claim against another state out of concern for their relationship with
the other state or because they have measures similar to those that
the investor is concerned about and which they would not want
challenged. In addition, the cost of being a party to investor-state
arbitration is high. Awards can be large and the costs of participating
in an arbitration, even if the state is successful, are significant.
Because of the high costs of investor-state arbitration, states may be
reluctant to enact measures that might even be a breach of their
obligations -this chilling effect is exacerbated by arbitration decisions
that are inconsistent and that have adopted surprising interpretations
of investment obligations. Third, investors cannot be made
accountable for their actions in investor-state arbitration. The
arbitration process gives rise to concerns regarding its legitimacy and
democratic accountability, including: (a) lack of transparency; (b)
179. See George K. Foster, Recovering "Protection and Security'" The Treaty Standards
Obscure Origins, Forgotten leaning, and Kei Current Significance, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1095, 1097-98 (2012).
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lack of access to Civil Society (NGOs) to the process; (c) lack of
knowledge on the part of tribunals regarding non-investment issues
related to public policy considerations like human rights and the
environment; and (d) limited knowledge on the part of tribunals
about host state domestic laws and policies that must be interpreted
in arbitration cases. Another key issue is that arbitral decisions have
been inconsistent, thereby making obligations less predictable.1 80
Currently, there is a huge debate regarding how to address this issue.
All the above concerns are of a serious nature and have led many
states to reconsider the benefits of ISD arbitration of IIAs
commitments in their present form.
This has led to some modifications in recent agreements. For
example, the Canadian Model BIT (since 2003) and the U.S. Model
BIT (since 2004) have adopted public disclosure requirements for
most documents and awards, and the authority to allow amicus curiae
submissions has been included. This transparency of process may add
to the cost of arbitration, but it may also simultaneously increase the
public attention to ISDs. This may lead to less use of process by
investors and also impair the achievement of investment promotional
goals of BITs, but they have currently become essential to the
political legitimacy of investor-state procedures. Another approach
recently taken by Australia is not to negotiate ISD settlement in
future BITs. Similarly, India has declared that it will not agree to
investor-state arbitration in the FTA that it is currently negotiating
with the European Union ("EU").
E. OTHER BENEHTS
Some IIAs also include provisions on performance requirements,
provisions transfer of funds, and umbrella clauses, as discussed below.
As only a minority of IIAs deal these issues, the discussions will be
concise.
180. See generall Andrea K. Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as
Jurisprudence Constante, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF
THE DISCIPLINE 265 (Colin B. Picker et al. eds., 2008). See also Jeffery P. Commission,
Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Citation Analysis of a Developing
Juisprudence, 24 J. INT'L. ARB. 129, 130 (2007); Ole Kristian Fauchald, The LegalReasoning of
ICSID Tribunals. An Empirical Anallisis, 19 FUR. J. INT'L L. 301,334-35 (2008).
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1. Performance Requirements
Performance requirements ("PRs") are the obligations imposed
by host states as a condition of (i) admission of an investment of (ii)
permitting the continued operation of an investment. PRs are
imposed by the host countries to seek certain benefits associated with
investment, but they have been controversial because of objections by
investors.81 Host countries argue that PRs could bring substantial
benefits to national development by requiring investors to export, to
provide training, and to transfer technology. PRs restricting imports
help to cover the risks of balance-of-payments problems resulting
from excessive flows to purchase imports. However, the investors
consider PRs against the basic principle of NT where they are applied
to foreigners only and as imposing inefficient restrictions on how they
conduct business.
Under the WTO Trade-Related Investment Measures
Agreement ("TRIMS"), PRs affecting trade in goods in a manner
contrary to GATT Article III (National Treatment) or Article IX
(prohibitions of quotas) are prohibited. Under the GATS agreement
in the WTO, PRs affecting trade in services in a manner inconsistent
with GATS are prohibited. These include requirements relating to
export performance by foreign investors, domestic content in
products produced by foreign investors, domestic sourcing by foreign
investors, restrictions on imports based on a foreign investors exports
(trade balancing), and restrictions on a foreign investor's access to
foreign exchange based on the foreign exchange it generates through
export sales (foreign exchange balancing).
Generally, we do not find restrictions on the use of PRs in BITs.
However, U.S. and Canadian IIAs prohibit PRs imposed at the time
of admission of investments and after admission. In both models, the
list of prohibited PRs goes beyond TRIMS. This is because the
performance requirements prohibited include requirements for
technology transfer and product mandating as well as export
performance, domestic content, domestic sourcing, trade balancing,
foreign exchange balancing, in connection with the establishment,
181. See Andrew T. Guzman, I75hv LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaininbg the
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 673 (1998).
Summer 2015
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation or sale of an
investment. 182 In this regard, these treaties may generate
performance requirements disputes. Merrill & Ring v. Canada agrees
with S. D. Myers v. Canada and Pope & Talbot v. Canada and held
that measures which may have an incidentally adverse effect on the
investor's exports do not appear to be the kind of performance
requirement prohibited by Article 1106, which needs to be directly
and specifically connected to exports.18 3
2. Transfer of Funds
A commitment of a host state to permit the transfer of funds into
and out of a host state is of key consideration for an investor.18 4 For
the host state, it is important to have policy space to monitor, regulate
and in some cases control the flight of capital. 85 In early treaties,
there were no exceptions to transfer-of-funds commitments, even
though in certain circumstances, like a balance of payments crisis,
there are legitimate reasons to control capital flight.
18 6
182. Article 92 of the Pakistan-Malaysia Closer Economic Partnership Agreement prohibits
performance requirements as envisaged in TRIMS. "For the purposes of this Chapter, the
Parties reaffirm their commitments to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
in Annex IA to the WTO Agreement (hereinafter referred to as 'TRIMS') and hereby
incorporate the provisions of the TRIMS, as may be amended, as part of this Chapter. A Party
shall, upon notification by the other Party, promptly convene consultations with the other Party
on any matter relating to this Article that affects the other Party's investors and their
investments." Malaysia-Pakistan Closer Economic Partnership Agreement, Malay. -Pak., art. 92,
Nov. 8, 2007. The effect of incorporating TRIMS obligations in an investment treaty is that it
renders the obligations subject to the dispute resolution provisions in the agreement.
183. Merrill & Ring Forestry L. P. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID,
Administrated, Award, 111, 117-18 (2010).
184. See United Nations Conference on Trade And Development, New York, U.S. and
Geneva, Switz., 2000, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements,
Transfer of Funds, art 3., UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/20 (July 2000).
185. See Scott L. Hoffman, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF INTERNATIONAL PROJECT
FINANCE: A RESOURCE FOR GOVERNMENTS, SPONSORS, LAWYERS, AND PROJECT
PARTICIPANTS 41 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 3d ed. 2008).
186. See Jirgen Kurtz, Adjuding the Exceptional at International Investment Law.:
Securiti. Public Order and Financial Crisis, 59 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 325, 326 (2010). See also
William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinarv
Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded leasures Provisions in Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 307, 349 (2008); Julien Chaisse, Exploring the Confines
of International Investment and Domestic Health Protections-General Exceptions Clause as a
Forced Perspective, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 332 (2013). On some more specific aspects of the WTO
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Although IMF rules prohibit controls on funds transfers related
to current transactions, these rules do not apply to capital
transactions (i.e., investment). GATS provisions prohibit controls on
capital flows in connection with sectors in which a state has made
specific commitments in its national schedule of commitments.
18 7
Disputes regarding transfer of funds obligations rarely come up to
investor-state arbitration.
The clauses on transfer payments are considered noy only by
investors, but also by the host country as the most important in a
bilateral treaty. 88 They deal with one aspect of the relationship
between the host country and the foreign investor on which their
interests can be widely divergent. 89 Whereas such clauses can and do
differ from treaty to treaty, most IIAs stipulate that a wide range of
payments and other-investment related funds shall have a right to be
transferred out of the host state without delay, and, typically, in a
freely convertible currency.190 Some IIAs allow deviation from the
exceptions, see also BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 441 (2001) (discussing GATT Article XX's
application to human rights and labor standards); Glenn Weiser, The Clean Development
Mechanism Versus the World Trade Orianization: Can Free-Mlarket Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Abatement Survive Free Trade?, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 531, 553-55, 583-85
(1999) (discussing the WTO Dispute Settlement Body's tendencies to interpret Article XX
narrowly and to respond negatively towards unilateral trade measures adopted to protect the
global commons).
187. See Julien Chaisse, Deconstructing Services and Investment Negotiations - A Case
Studi of India at WTO GATS and Investment Fora, 14 J. OF WORLD INVESTMENT AND
TRADE 44 (2013).
188. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 18, at 191-92.
189. The numerous investment claims brought against Argentina in the wake of its 2001
financial crisis have sparked a debate on the risks of not subjecting such guarantees to certain
exceptions. But while this particular crisis might have brought attention to this issue, it has
always been controversial. Jeswald W. Salacuse thus stated in 1990: "[T]he negotiation of BIT
provisions on monetary transfer is often one of the most difficult negotiations to conclude.
Capital-exporting countries seek broad, unrestricted guarantees on monetary transfers, while
developing countries press for limited guarantees, subject to a variety of exceptions." See Lauge
Skovgaard Poulsen, THE IMPORTANCE OF BITS FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND
POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE: REVISITING THE EVIDENCE, IN YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2009/2010 110 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2010). See also Duncan
Williams, Policy Perspectives on the Use of Capital Controls in Emerging Nations. Lessons
From the Asian Financial Crisis and a Look at the International Leeal Regime, 70 FORDHAM L.
REV. 561, 614 (2001); Horacio Grigera Naon, Sovereisnty and Regionalism, 27 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L BUS. 1073, 1077-78 (1996).
190. A very comprehensive agreement would normally cover: (i) "returns" on investment,
including all profits, benefits, interest, capital gains, royalties, and management, technical
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obligations enshrined in the transfer of funds provision in four
cases. 9 Whereas this is most common in FTAs, which usually allow
the introduction of safeguards motivated by the balance of payments
or external financial difficulties,'9 - exceptions of this nature are rather
unusual in bilateral investment agreements. In constructing the
BITSel, we made the hypothesis that a broad guarantee to allow
outward transfers is likely to attract FDI while exceptions to the
principle have to be considered as being relatively less encouraging to
FDI. Indeed, from the foreign investors' point of view, these clauses
are key in investment treaties, as the ability to freely repatriate funds
can be an important factor in their investment-decision process. This
issue of a host state's legitimate reasons for restricting funds transfer
has been addressed through specific treaty provisions in more recent
agreements with certain exceptions to the transfer-of-funds
obligation. 93
assistance or other fees; (ii) proceeds from the liquidation or sale or all or any part of the
investment; and (iii) payments under a contract, and earnings of other remuneration of
foreigner personnel in connection with the investment. Austria-Hong Kong provides for a
relatively broad one: "[U]nrestricted right to transfer abroad their investments ... and returns"
and "Investors shall also have the unrestricted right to transfer abroad in particular, but not
exclusively .... Transfers of currency shall be effected without delay in any freely convertible
currency." Agreement Between the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of the
Republic of Austria for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, supra note 127, at art. 7.
191. One option is to subject the transfer clause to domestic laws, in which case the host state
is free to limit the flow of capital out of its economy, for instance during economic crises, as long
as it is done through law. See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Mutual Protection of
Investments, Port.-Bulg., art. 5, May 27, 1993. Another option is to allow exceptions to the free
transfer of funds, but only during balance-of-payments difficulties and typically with a
requirement that such restrictions should be necessary, non-discriminatory and on a temporary
basis. See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-Arg., art. 6,
Dec. 11, 1990. Finally, some treaties include other major limitations that permit restrictions on
capital flight, such as certain Chilean BITs attempting to restrict short term capital in- and
outflows. See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Chile-Austria, art. 4, Sept. 8, 1999. Other possible exception: host state should be able to
prevent foreign investors from freely transferring revenues and capital out of its country if it
were under economic difficulties.
192. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea
and the Government of the Republic of Singapore, S. Kor-Sing., art. 10.12, Aug. 4, 2005; North
American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 21.04, Dec. 8, 1993 [hereinafter
NAFTA].
193. For example, the Canadian Model FIPA Article 14 on Transfer of Funds provides an
example of a transfer-of-funds provision that contains exceptions for the various reasons that
states may need to control funds transfer. It provides as follows: "1. Each Party shall permit all
transfers relating to a covered investment to be made freely, and without delay, into and out of
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3. Umbrella Clause
Some IIAs cover only those disputes which relate to an
"obligation under this agreement", i.e., only for claims of BIT
violations.1 94  Others extend the jurisdiction to "any dispute relating
to investments." Some others create an international law obligation
that a host state shall, for example, "observe any obligation it may
have entered to," "constantly guarantee the observance of the
commitments it has entered into," "observe any obligation it has
assumed," and other formulations, in respect to investments.1 9' These
provisions are commonly called "umbrella clauses."9 In essence, an
its territory. Such transfers include: (a) Contributions to capital; (b) Profits, dividends, interest,
capital gains, royalty payments, management fees, technical assistance and other fees, returns in
kind and other amounts derived from the investment; (c) Proceeds from the sale of all or any
part of the covered investment or from the partial or complete liquidation of the covered
investment; (d) Payments made under a contract entered into by the investor, or the covered
investment, including payments made pursuant to a loan agreement; (e) Payments made
pursuant to Articles 12 and 13; and (f) Payments arising under Section C [investor-state
arbitration]. 2. Each Party shall permit transfers relating to a covered investment to be made in
the convertible currency in which the capital was originally invested, or in any other convertible
currency agreed by the investor and the Party concerned. Unless otherwise agreed by the
investor, transfers shall be made at the market rate of exchange applicable on the date of
transfer. 3. Notwithstanding paragraphs I and 2, a Party may prevent a transfer through the
equitable, non-discriminatory and good faith application of its laws relating to: (a) Bankruptcy,
insolvency or the protection of the rights of creditors; (b) Issuing, trading or dealing in
securities; (c) Criminal or penal offences; (d) Reports of transfers of currency or other monetary
instruments; or (e) Ensuring the satisfaction of judgments in adjudicatory proceedings .... 6.
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1, 2 and 4, and without limiting the applicability
of paragraph 5, a Party may prevent or limit transfers by a financial institution to, or for the
benefit of, an affiliate of or person related to such institution, through the equitable, non-
discriminatory and good faith application of measures relating to maintenance of the safety,
soundness, integrity or financial responsibility of financial institutions." See Canadian FIPA
Model, supra note 133, at art. 14.
194. See Jarrod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties. Of Breaches of
Contract, Treaty Violations, and the Divide Between Developing and Developed Countries in
Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135, 138 (2006).
195. See Stephan W. Schill, Enabling Private Ordering. Function, Scope and Effect of
Umbrella Clauses in International Investment Treaties, 18 MINN. J. INT'L L. 1, 52 (2009).
196. An umbrella clause can be drafted in different ways. Compare Treaty for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Ger.-Pak., art. 7, Nov. 25, 1959, 65 U.N.T.S. 28
("Either Party shall observe any other obligation it may have entered into with regard to
investments by nationals or companies of the other party.") irith Agreement between Australia
and the Republic of Poland on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.-
Pol., art. 10, May 7, 1991 ("A Contracting Party shall, subject to its law, do all in its power to
ensure that a written undertaking given by a competent authority to a national of the other
Contracting Party with regard to an investment is respected.") irith Agreement between the
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umbrella clause extends the scope of the application of a BIT, and it
offers more protection to the investor.1 97 An umbrella clause extends
the scope of application of BIT because it offers more protection to
the foreign investor.1 98 If it contains an umbrella clause, it is a
positive sign that we hypothesize will be an incentive for the investor
to invest. Conversely, if there is no such umbrella clause, there will
be a relatively lesser interest to use a BIT to invest.
V. CURTAILING TREATY SHOPPING: OPTIONS
One of the most important issues in an investment treaty is to
define who is an investor whose rights are protected under the
treaty.1 99 Investors must be related to the state party to the treaty
other than the one complained against (the host state) in order to
Government of the Republic of Singapore and the Government of the Czech Republic on the
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Sing.-Czech, art. 15, April 8, 1995 ("(2) Each
Contracting Party shall observe commitments, additional to those specified in this Agreement it
has entered in to with respect to investments of the investors of the other Contracting Party.
Each Contracting Party shall not interfere with any commitments, additional to those specified
in this Agreement, entered into by nationals or companies with the nationals or companies of
the other Contracting Party as regards their investments.").
197. For a discussion of the role of stabilization clauses in this respect, see generaly Sam
Foster Halabi, Efficient Contracting Between Foreign Investors and Host States: Evidence from
Stabilization Clauses, 31 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 261 (2011).
198. The SGS v. Philippines Decision on Jurisdiction holds that the text of the clause in the
BIT is capable of applying to obligations arising under national law, e.g., those arising from a
contract; indeed, it would normally be under its own law that a host State would assume
obligations "with regard to specific investments in its territory by investors of the other
contracting party." SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines,
ICSID Case No. ARB/(P/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, 115 (Jan.29, 2004).
199. "Another concern is treaty shopping by investors for the sole purpose of obtaining
protection of BITs. Some of the new provisions included in the new model BITs address this
problem directly. For instance, the new models include a Denial of Benefits Clause that allows a
state to deny benefits of the treaty to an investor of the other party if 1) the enterprise has no
substantial business activities in the territory of the other party, and 2) if persons of a non-party,
or of the denying party, own or control the enterprise (i.e., shell companies). The extent to
which these provisions will avoid treaty shopping still remains to be seen. The application of this
type of clause has already caused a number of treaty interpretation problems. In the Norway
Model BIT, the requirement of substantial business activities is directly contained in the
definition of investor, which leaves it to tribunals to delineate the concept of substantial
business activities. Also, the new Canada Model BIT provides that Most Favored Nation
('MFN') treatment does not extend to treatment accorded under existing treaties, and thus the
MFN guarantees are applicable only to future treaty provisions." Gabriela Alvarez, lapping
the Future of Investment Treati Arbitration as a Sstem of La, 103 AM. SOC'Y INT'LL. PROC.
328, 328 (2009).
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benefit from the investor protection obligations in the host state.
Section A reviews the law applicable to the definition of "investor."
The issue to be addressed is what connection is required between an
investor and a state. Section B then looks at the definition of
"investment" which further delineates the scope of application of the
treaty which simultaneously determine the benefits of the potential
treaty shopping. Section C examines the requirement of "investment
legality" as a direct way to control treaty shopping. Section D
analyzes the control of the foreign investment when it enters the host
country. Section E explores the growing role of the denial of benefits
clause in IIAs.
A. DEHNING THE FOREIGN CORPORATION AS INVESTOR
Typically, for natural persons, a national of a state party to a
treaty or a citizen of the state is considered to be an investor of that
state. 00 The nationality is determined by the law of the state whose
nationality is to be claimed to the extent not addressed in the treaty.'01
Dual nationality, like in the case of many developing countries, may
be permitted by state law20 - The possibility of dual nationality raises
the question of whether dual nationals are allowed to be protected
under a treaty if they have the nationality of the host state. The
majority of treaties do not give an answer to this, but some attach a
condition, such as considering what state a person has the most
substantial connection as a way of defining nationality for the
200. See David A. Williams, Jurisdiction andAdmissibilit, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 884-85 (Christoph Schreuer ed., 2008).
201. "The rule of International Law [is] that in a case of dual nationality a third power is not
entitled to contest the claim of one of the two powers whose national is interested in the case by
referring to the nationality of the other power." Salem (US. v. Egeipt), 2 R.I.A.A. 1165, 1188
(U.S.-Egypt Special Claims Tribunal 1932) (holding that possession of dual U.S./Persian
citizenship did not bar claims against Egypt). The same principle has been now embraced by the
International Law Commission in its Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection. See International
Laiw Commission on Diplomatic Protection, art. 6, G.A. Res. 61/10, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006)
(addressing "multiple nationality and claim against a third State").
202. Int'l Ctr. for the Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID], 2 HISTORY OF THE ICSID
CONVENTION: DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND FORMULATION OF THE
CONVENTION 236, 255-57 (1968).
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purposes of the treaty. Residency in a specific state typically is not
required. °3
The next issue is, who is a legal or juridical person, such as a
corporation'? IIAs typically require that a legal person must be
incorporated or organized under the domestic laws of a party in order
to claim its nationality.2°4 It is quite simple for foreigners to meet this
condition and to qualify for treaty protection. It is also easy for host
states to determine whether a legal person qualifies for protection.
The problems with such a definition are that it leads to a very broad
protection and may need to be confined with some conditions. The
need to further limit who qualifies as an investor depends on the
domestic policy of the host state. Some states may not want further
limits because they want to make it as easy as possible for investors to
qualify for protection under the treaty.
Other states may be concerned about "treaty shopping." Where
simple incorporation in a country gives an investor the nationality of
that country, there is a risk that investors may take advantage of
treaty protection simply by incorporating a subsidiary in one party
state for the purpose of making an investment in another party state.
A domestic investor in one party state could even seek the protection
of the treaty against its own government by channeling an investment
through a subsidiary in the other party state back into the first party
state. Some countries-for example, Mauritius-that want to be an
international business hubs, are not concerned about this problem,
but other countries may want to manage their exposure to treaty
obligations and are interested in targeting only a narrow class of
203. See Champion Trading Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/(P/9, Decision on Jurisdiction,
3.4.1 (discussing claimants' argument that their involuntary Egyptian nationality should not be
taken into account when interpreting the Convention).
204. See, e.g., Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on
Jurisdiction, 137 (Aug. 3, 2004) (stating although "there [was] no explicit reference to direct or
indirect investment as such in the [Germany-Argentina BIT]," BIT covered indirect investment,
notwithstanding that there were "interposed companies between the investment and the
ultimate owner of the company"); accord Noble Energy Inc v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/12, Decision on Jurisdiction, 77 (Mar. 5, 2008). "The Tribunal concurs with previous
tribunals that have held that an indirect shareholder can bring a claim under the ICSID
Convention and under a BIT in respect of a direct and an indirect investment. Failing any
contrary wording, the BIT and the ICSID Convention encompass actions of indirect
shareholders for their damages." Id.
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investors. To avoid treaty shopping, certain limitations are used in
IIAs. These are as follows.
The requirement that the ultimate owners who control
investment to be nationals of the home state party. This is a rare
approach in IIAs but it would avoid misuse of protection. Such an
approach is used in the Germany-Antigua and Barbuda BIT.
Transnational corporations often have quite complex structures, and
this makes it difficult to determine where ultimate control resides.
The requirement that a legal person must have substantial
business activity, or its seat (location of effective management), head
office, or some other significant connection, located in a state party.
This is a common approach adopted in IIAs, but it is quite vague and
it can lead to uncertainty when the issue is addressed in investor-state
tribunals. Sometimes tribunals, in interpreting the requirement for
the seat to be in a party state, have required a minimal connection.
For example, in one case, it was held that if one director is resident in
the jurisdiction and the corporation files its financial statement in that
country, the seat of the corporation is in that country. Hence the
application of this requirement can be hard to predict in practice.
Another alternative to address treaty shopping is a denial of
benefits provision (see below).
B. DEHNING THE FOREIGN CORPORATION ASSETS AS
"INVESTMENT"
While "investment" is generally considered a collection of
resources for a given period used for future profits, the formal
definitions found in international instruments have significant
variations. Against this legal background, we make two hypotheses:
(1) when the definition of "investment" is broad, there is a strong
incentive to invest; and (2) when it is narrow, the contrary (less
investments will be covered or protected) the risk is higher for the
investor. In constructing the BITSel and coding the IIAs, we
considered that the "asset-based "' °'0  definition and the
205. Such lists typically include five categories of material and immaterial assets: (1) movable
and immovable property and any related property rights such as mortgages, liens or pledges; (2)
various types of interests in companies, such as shares, stock, bonds, debentures or any other
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"tautological, 20 6 approach of the definition of investment provide a
broad definition of investment, while the "closed-list " 2' 7 definition
and other techniques that exclude certain assets and transactions
from the definition 20 8 tend to narrow the definition of investment and
hence automatically reduce the scope of application of the BIT.
Policymakers framing the agreements are faced with further
issues regarding the definition of investment.
Should investment be required to contribute to development?
The issue is whether the contribution to development in IIAs should
be made an eligibility criterion. Host states would like to be sure that
investments would be protected only if they contributed to
development. Investors would likely see such a requirement as
creating substantial uncertainty regarding whether an investment
would qualify for protection, in the absence of a standard definition
form of participation in a company, business enterprise or joint venture; (3) claims to money
and claims under a contract having a financial value and loans directly related to a specific
investment; (4) intellectual property rights; and (5) business concessions, that is, rights conferred
by law or under contracts. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Hong Kong and
the Government of the Republic of Austria for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
supra note 127, at art. 1. Some BITs only refer to "all direct investment." Agreeement between
the Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Hungary on Mutual Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Bulg.-Hung., art. 1, June 8, 1994 ("The term "investment" shall mean every kind of
asset ... [T]hese assets shall refer to all direct investment made in accordance with the laws and
regulations in the territory of the Contracting Party .... ").
206. The tautological definition of "investment" can be flexible enough to apply to new types
of investment that might emerge in the future. Numerous BITs concluded by the United States
illustrate this approach, such as the BIT with Bahrain, which defines an "investment" as "every
kind of investment" and not only "every kind of asset." Bahrain Bilateral Investment Treaty,
U.S.-Bahr., art. 1, Sept. 29, 1999.
207. The third approach that has emerged to avoid an excessively broad definition of
"investment" is what is called a "closed-list" definition. It consists of an ample but finite list of
tangible and intangible assets. Originally envisaged as an "enterprise-based" definition used in
the context of U.S.-Canada FTA, this approach evolved towards the definition used in Article
1139 of NAFTA. See NAFTA, supra note 192, at art. 1139. It has been incorporated into the
2004 Canadian BIT model. See also Canadian FIPA Model, supra note 133.
208. In NAFTA, investment means: (a) an enterprise; (b) an equity security of an enterprise;
(c) a debt security of an enterprise (i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or (ii)
where the original maturity of the debt security is at least three years, but does not include a
debt security, regardless of original maturity, of a state enterprise; but investment does not
mean, (i) claims to money that arise solely from (i) commercial contracts for the sale of goods or
services by a national or enterprise in the territory of a Party to an enterprise in the territory of
another Party, or (ii) the extension of credit in connection with a commercial transaction, such
as trade financing, other than a loan covered by subparagraph (d); or () any other claims to
money, that do not involve the kinds of interests set out in subparagraphs (a) through (h).
NAFTA, supra note 192, at art. 1139.
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of development. If such a requirement were included in a treaty, in
the case of arbitration, a host state could claim that the tribunal did
not have jurisdiction on the basis that the investment did not
contribute to development.
Should portfolio investment or only FDI be included in the
definition of investment? Because portfolio investments do not
involve sunk costs and the time perspective is not long, if a portfolio
investor is not happy with the treatment in the host country, it could
sell and leave the country. This raises the issue of whether a treaty
needs to protect, such as investment where an investor is free to leave
at any time. The host state might not want to add any obligation to a
portfolio, if as a result of inclusion of portfolio investment, investors
would not be attracted. Another reason why host states would also
not like to include portfolio investment is that it would add an
obligation towards many investors creating a risk of multiple claims.
On the other hand, small portfolio investors may also not like to bear
the high costs of arbitration which may mitigate the risk of claims. It
will be possible, in some cases, however, for portfolio investors that
are affected in identical ways by host state action to bring their claims
collectively. Third, there is an issue of how to define "portfolio
investment." The IMF definition of the term is more than 250 pages
long which shows that it is not simple to do. One shortcut could be to
define portfolio investment as less than a ten percent share in the
equity of a business. Nevertheless, portfolio investment may be
highly complementary to FDI and hard to distinguish from FDI in
practice. Also, portfolio investment may be attractive to host states
because it may supplement local sources of capital while leaving
control in local hands.
Should assets not used for business purposes be excluded from
the definition of investment? Another issue is that host countries
sometimes want to exclude assets that are not used for business
purposes. For example, investments in real estate for recreational
purposes, which are not expected to generate profit and contribute
towards the host country economy, could be excluded. Similarly, a
host country may also have a policy of not allowing a specific area of
residential real estate to be sold to foreign buyers. For a state to be
permitted to do that in a manner consistent with an IIA, such
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investments must be excluded from the definition of investment or be
addressed in an exception clause.
What type of financial transactions are to be included in the
definition? Generally short term investment like all portfolio
investment is not excluded from the definition for the reasons
discussed above. Some treaties, however, contain narrower
limitations. One commonly used approach is to limit the definition of
investment by imposing a condition on the eligibility of debt claims.
For example, short term debt instruments with a maturity of less than
three years may be excluded. Such short term investments may not
be considered essential to development. Also, they are volatile and
do not need protection. Similarly, the buying and selling of short
term instruments is not like long term investments and hence they are
not considered as being protected. Alternatively, an exception for
prudential regulation may be used to preserve state policy-making
flexibility to regulate financial flows, including short term
investments. One specific approach is to introduce an exception in a
Transfer of Funds provision (discussed below). A general exception
from all treaty obligations could also be used to address a threat to
national security or money laundering, etc.
C. REQUIRING THE LEGALITY OF INVESTMENT
The legality of investment is of great significance for all
stakeholders, because generally the treaties offer protection to only
those investments which are admitted "in accordance with law.'' -0 9
Most treaties require that if the investment is not admitted in
accordance with the host state's domestic law, then no protection is
available under the treaty. This legality requirement is either
introduced in the definition of investment or a provision defining the
209. See Bottini, supra note 10, at ch. 12 (discussing "The Legality of Investments under
ICSID Jurisprudence"). By examining ICSID case law in detail, Bottini concludes that,
although ICSID jurisprudence is unanimous in condemning acts of corruption in procuring
international contracts, greater deference should be accorded to local courts, which are better
equipped than international tribunals to deal with matters relating to corruption at local level.
See generai MICHAEL WAIBEL ET AL., THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY (Kluwer Law Int'l ed., 2012).
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scope of the agreement 10 It adds an incentive for investors to seek
admission or approval for their investments.
The tribunal in Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services
Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines explained in relation to the
"in accordance with the law" provision being considered in that case:
[t]he [bilateral investment treaty ("BIT")] is, to be sure, an
international instrument, but its Articles . . . effect a renvoi to
national law, a mechanism which is hardly unusual in treaties ....
A failure to comply with the national law to which a treaty refers
will have an international legal effect•
Similarly, the tribunal in Tokios Tokeles stated that, "[t]he
requirement in Article 1(1) of the Ukraine-Lithuania BIT that
investments be made in compliance with the laws and regulations of
the host state is a common requirement in modern BITs.<' 21
One example of a case where a tribunal denied jurisdiction over
a claimant's claims due to the investment's failure to accord with the
laws of the host state is Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of E
Salvado-r.2
13
"In that case, the tribunal found that based on the language of the
BIT and its travaux prdparatoires, "the will of the parties to the [El
Salvador-Spain] BIT was to exclude from the scope of application
and protection of the Agreement disputes originating from
investments which were not made in accordance with the laws of
the host State." The tribunal further found that the claimant had
fraudulently misrepresented itself in a bidding process for
210. See Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/24, Award, 125 (June 18, 2010) ("[I]t is clear that States may specifically and
expressly condition access of investors to a chosen dispute settlement mechanism, or the
availability of substantive protection. One such common condition is an express requirement
that the investment comply with the internal legislation of the host State. This condition will
typically appear in the BIT where this is the instrument that contains the State's consent to
ICSID arbitration."); see also Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/26, Award, 184 (Aug. 2, 2006).
211. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Serv. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/25, Award, 394 (Aug. 16,2007).
212. Tokios Tokeles, ICSID Case No. ARB/(P/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, 84.
213. Inceisa Vallisoletana, S.L., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, 195; see also id at
208 ("The Tribunal having decided that the consent given by the Kingdom of Spain and the
Republic of El Salvador excludes investments not made in accordance with the laws of the host
State, it must determine whether the investment that generated the dispute raised before it was
made in accordance with the laws of ... El Salvador, and in order to determine thereafter
whether this Tribunal is competent or not to hear the dispute submitted to it.").
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government contracts. As a result, the tribunal determined that it
had no jurisdiction over the dispute because Inceysa's investment
did not meet the BIT's requirement of legality."2
14
This gives leverage to host states because they are not under an
obligation to admit all investments, and they retain control of
admission. Most treaties do not grant a right for foreign investors to
enter and establish their operations (called a "Right of
Establishment"), although some treaties, including those negotiated
by Canada, the U.S. and Japan, do provide for a limited right of
establishment. Developing or least developed countries that may
have a weak regulatory system need to have a right to control
admission, so that they can achieve their development. This issue is
further discussed below.
The requirement for legality operates at the time of entry, and it
does not mean that ongoing legality is a requirement for an
investment to be eligible for protection under the treaty. If properly
admitted, then subsequent irregularity is not likely to disqualify the
investment for protection. Practically, this is required to protect the
right of an investor in case of a subsequent change of government
policy after the admission of investment. However, if the admission
process is seriously defective, such as where an approval is based on
false information or bribery, and the admission is achieved, then the
investment may not be protected. Finally, the legality requirement
does not mean that the definition of investment in domestic law
overrides the definition in the treaty. Investments protected are
defined as in the treaty, not as in domestic law.
"In accordance with the law" clauses, found in many investment
treaties, are most often limited to requiring compliance with host-
state law. However, there may be a case where a tribunal faced
with an "in accordance with host state law" clause finds that it has
jurisdiction, but also finds that the claimant's claims are
inadmissible due to the investment's non-compliance with
international legal principles. Though such an argument has yet to
be explored by a tribunal, it appears theoretically possible by
following the logic adopted by the Plama tribunal, and, to an
extent, the Hamester tribunal. Further, most investment treaties
214. See Rahim Moloo & Alex Khachaturian, The Compliance 111th The La w Requirement
In InternationalinvestmentLa i, 34 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1473, 1478 (2011).
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limit the "in accordance with the law" requirement to compliance
with the law at the initiation of the investment. This makes sense
given that the entirety of an investment procured or initiated
through an illegal act is tainted by that illegality. That is, the
investor's hands are unclean with respect to the entirety of the
investment. For the same reason, in assessing the admissibility of a
claimant's claims, the "in accordance with the law assessment"
should also be made with respect to the initiation of the investment
in question. Illegalities arising at some later stage of the investment
may have an impact on certain claims based specifically on the
illegal conduct, or on the amount of damages granted for a breach,
but may not deem all of the claims of the investor inadmissible.
There may be an instance, however, where, although the
investment is procured legally, illegality pervades the investment to
such an extent that all of the claims are in some way based on the
claimant's illegality. In such a situation, it should be open to a
tribunal to deem all of the claimants' claims inadmissible.
215
D. CONTROLLING TIE ADMISSION OF THE INVESTMENT
Regarding the issue of admission and establishment, there are
two different basic treaty models.
The first model is that there are no preestablishment rights, and
that the host countries are not under any obligation regarding
admission. The treaty standards apply only after the admission of
investment, in accordance with the domestic law of the host states.
This is a common approach, and it allows a country to regulate and
establish criteria for admission which may change from time to time
in accordance with its domestic law. This allows a host country to
have discretion and a gatekeeper approach to determine in which
sectors it should permit admission.
The second model is that the treaty includes a commitment to
admit investments (a "Right of Establishment"). Some countries
limit the commitment based on a positive or negative list approach,
and some use exclusions based on domestic policy like protecting
national security or public health. Some countries reduce
commitments by permitting admission criteria and procedure like
215. See Moloo & Khachaturian, supra note 214 at 1500-01.
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Canada's, the Investment Canada Act review, whereby a financial
threshold is established and an investment review is conducted on any
investment more than that above the threshold. To do that, there is a
need to add a specific reservation. A right of establishment could be
created through MIN and NT obligations that extend to the pre-
establishment period (e.g., the NAFTA Model).1 6
In general terms, majority of BITs do not provide entry rights to
foreign investors into their territory (Table 4). Only a very limited
number of IIAs, such as the Japan-Thailand PTA and the Indonesia-
Japan PTAs, provide establishment rights.
Table 4 Variations on establishment in investment treaties
E ach Contracting Party shall encourage and create
favorable conditions for investors of the other
Contracting Part\ to make investmenLs in its territory,
and admit such invstwents in accordance with its
laws and policy"
"'Each Contracting Party shafa sock and obtain
approval from the authorities of its relex ant place to
the effect that investments by investors of the other
relevant place and the returns therefore shall receive
treatment which is fair and equitable and not less
favorable than that accorded to inv5stmells by
investors of any third party."
"his Agreement shall apply to investments j... tt
investments by investors of the Republic of Indonesia
in the territo% of the Kingdom of "thailand v.hich
have been speciicaly approved in witqg by
competent authorities of Thailand in accordance with
the applicable law\s and regulations of the Kingdom of
Thailand and any laws amending or replacing them."
I.- .I each Party shall accord to invcstors of the other
Party and to their investment, treatment no less
lavourable than that it accords, in like circumstances.
to its own imestors and to their invesiments with





















216. See NAFTA, supra note 192, at art. 1102 ("Each Party shall accord to investors of
another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own
investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct,
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.").
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cxpansfon of investments in its Area. 2. Fach Party
shall, subject to its laws and regulations cxisting (Un
the date of entry into force of this Agreement, accord
to investors of the other Party and to their
imcstmenLs treatment no less favourable than that it
accords, in like circunmtanccs, to its own investors
and to their iivestmentLs with respect to the
management, conduct, operaton, maintenance, use,
enjoyment and sale or other disposition of
in vestments in its Area"
"I-ach Party shall accord to investors of the other Pre-
Party and to their investmen s treatment no Iex establishment
favourable than that it accords in like circumstances right
to iLs own investors and to their investments with
respect to investment actviies."
Art. 58 (g) -the term "investment activities" means
establishment, acquiidon, expanston, management,
conduct, operaton, maintenance, use, cjoymcnt and
sale or other disposition ofinv stmenW.
-- ILch Partv shall accord to investors of another I're-
Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, cstablishlent
in like circumstances, to its own investors with rspect right
to the stabliskment, acquisition, expansion,
management, conduct operation, and sale or other
disposition of investments in its territory. 2. 1 ach
Party shall accord to covered investments treatment
no lt,,, favourablc than that it accords, in like
circumstances, to invegstments in iLs territory of its
own investors with respect to the establishment,
acqutsidon, expansion, management, cnduct
operation, and sale or other dispositon of
in vestments in its tenitay"
Source: Elaborated by the author
Most BITs provide only a best-endeavor provision in regard to
the admission of foreign investments (see the India-China BIT). Such
IIAs follow the well-known admission clause model, which allows the
host country to apply any admission and screening mechanism for
foreign investment which it may have in place and which therefore
determines the conditions on which foreign investment will be
allowed to enter the country. - 7 In these cases, in order to receive the
217. On the issue of admission, the tribunal in Churchill and Planet v. Indonesia clarified
that the admission requirement in both BITs is a one-time occurrence, a gateway through all
investors must pass once; the admission requirement is consequently of a jurisdictional nature; it
necessarily applies at the time of entry into the host State and not during the entire operation of
the project. Planet Mining Pty Ltd v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14 and
12/40, Decision on Jurisdiction, 266-70, 274, 292 (Feb. 24, 2014).
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protection of a BIT, the disputed investments have to be in
conformity with the host state's laws and regulations; but, usually,
investments in the host state will only be excluded from the
protection of the treaty if they have been made in breach of the
fundamental legal principles of the host country1 '8 Furthermore, in
White Industries Australia Limited v. India, giving regard to the
views of commentators, it was noted that the "encourage and
promote" provisions are generally not seen to give rise to substantive
rights (and they hold in any event that the specific obligations
contended for by the claimant are not supported by the provision's
general wording).19
There is another approach that is followed in the GATS and
other agreements, in which a positive list approach is adopted
requiring NT and prohibiting specific restrictions on market access
such as limitations on foreign capital, requirements regarding the
form of investment (like joint venture), or the total value of service
operations. However, such prohibitions apply only to services listed
by a country in its National Schedule of Commitments and they are
subject to limitations written into the schedules.
Among the IIAs adopting the admission clause, some of them
deserve special mention in the way that they define the investment
covered by the treaty because it has a significant impact on
arbitration. Indeed, to date, a significant proportion of the small
number of investment claims advanced against Asian states has failed
on the question of jurisdiction involving a precondition of this sort.
For instance, in Yaung Chi Oo Trading v. Myanmar it was noted that
the 1987 ASEAN Agreement requires that the investment must be
"specifically approved in writing and registered by the host country
and upon such conditions as it deems fit for the purposes of this
Agreement". Also, it was found that if a state unequivocally and
without reservation approves in writing a foreign investment proposal
under its internal law, that investment must be taken to be registered
and approved for the purposes of the Agreement.2 °  Further
218. See, e.g., Rumeli Telekom A.S. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16,
Award, Q 319 (July 29, 2008).
219. White Industries Australia Limited v. The Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Final
Award, 9.2.5-9.2.13 (November 30, 2011).
220. Yaung Chi Oo Trading PTE Ltd. v. Government of the Union of Myanmar, ASEAN
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illustrations are given, for instance, by Gruslin v. Malaysia' 1 and
Fraport.i-- These cases represent a specific kind of investment
arbitration which could be seen as a "forced perspective" on case law
involving Asian states, because they cannot result in any violation.
As it can be seen from Table 4 above, when it comes to IIAs in
practice (e.g., the Indonesia-Thailand BIT and the Taiwan-Thailand
BIT), some states -Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia- delineate the
operation of substantive investment treaty protections by reference to
compliance with an element of domestic law regulating the entry of
foreign investment. Thailand, for instance, often obliges foreign
investors to show that they have been granted specific approval (see
the Thailand-Indonesia BIT) which can, in extreme cases, explicitly
require an approval in writing by a competent authority (see the
Thailand-Taiwan BIT). This considerably reduces the chances that an
investment will be protected by the BIT and hence it decreases the
exposure to investment claims.
Without clear proof of compliance with this one discrete element
across a possible spectrum of entry conditions, foreign investment will
not be protected by the BIT. An affirmative act of approval in
writing is thus a necessary and sufficient condition for conferring
treaty protection. This mechanism allows a state to calibrate its
investment treaty exposure to the approval (which will often take the
form of registration) of foreign investment under domestic law. It
also explains why states such as Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia,
which have concluded a large number of IlAs, have not been subject
to a large number of claims. As a matter of fact, although Malaysia
I.D. Case No. ARB/01/1, Award, 53, 59 (Mar. 31, 2003).
221. In Gruslin v. Alalaisia for instance, the single arbitrator declined to exercise jurisdiction
over portfolio investment by a Belgian national that had incurred loss as a result of Malaysian
capital controls imposed in response to the 1998 East Asian Financial Crisis. The arbitrator
ruled that general approval by the Malaysian stock exchange for the listing of shares held by the
Belgian national did not meet the required standard of an "approved project" under the BIT in
question. See genera]l Philippe Gruslin v. The State of Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/3,
Award (Nov. 27, 2000).
222. Fraport v. Philippines considers, for jurisdictional purposes, that the "in compliance
with" requirement is a jurisdictional limitation ratione materiae which relates the initiation of
the investment and not the way it was subsequently conducted (although that may be relevant
to a defense on the merits). Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Serv. gorldiride, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/25, 334,339-40, 344-45.
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has concluded more IIAs than India or Pakistan, it has not faced
many claims, partly because of the requirement of written approval.
E. DENIAL OF BENEFITS CLAUSE
Another alternative to address treaty shopping is a denial of
benefits provision. This means that instead of incorporating
requirements in the treaty definition of an investor, a host state can
deny benefits of the treaty, if particular criteria, such as seat, ultimate
ownership, or substantial business presence in a party state,223 could
not be established by the investor.
Although the international community experienced a large
increase in the number of international investment agreements in the
1980s and 1990s, discussion of the denial of benefits clause ("DOB
clause") can be traced back to the 1950s. In 1956, Herman Walker Jr.
noted, "The recent treaties signed by the United States, at any rate,
indicate that this possibility of a 'free ride' by third-country interests
is one to be guarded against .... 4 This concept of a "free ride" by
third party nationals is exactly what the denial of benefits clause
clause seeks to prevent. 5  While this idea was raised in 1950s
scholarship, it is more relevant today than ever.
A number of disputes relate to the regime of a denial of benefits
clause. 6  In Salini Costruttori S.P.A and Istralde v. Morocco, the
Tribunal declared that investment should contribute to the economy
of the host state, otherwise it cannot be considered an investment .
223. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 47, at art. 17(2) ("A Party may deny the benefits
of this Treaty to an investor of the other Party that is an enterprise of such other Party and to
investments of that investor if the enterprise has no substantial business activities in the territory
of the other Party and persons of a non-Party, or of the denying Party, own or control the
enterprise").
224. See Herman Walker Jr., Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial
Treaties, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 373, 388 (1956).
225. Id.
226. See, e.., Yukos Universal Ltd. v. Russian Federation, Interim Award on Jurisdiction
and Admissibility, PCA Case No. AA 227, PP 456-601 (Nov. 30, 2009) (rejecting invocation of a
denial of benefits clause in a treaty due to ownership structure of the investment).
227. Salini Costruttori S.P.A and Italstrade v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/0/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, Q 52 (Jul. 31, 2001) ("[O]ne may add the contribution to the
economic development of the host State of the investment as an additional condition"). See
Emmanuel Gaillard, Identifi- or Define? Reflections on the Evolution of the Concept of
Investment in ICSID Practice, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:
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Yaung Chi Oo Trading highlighted that the requirement of effective
management of the investing company in the place of incorporation
was primarily included in the 1987 ASEAN Agreement to avoid what
has been referred to as "protection shopping," i.e., the adoption of a
local corporate form without any real economic connection in order
to bring a foreign entity or investment within the scope of treaty
protection. - -8
More interesting, in Phoenix Action, an investor who was a
Czech national had a dispute with the Czech government. He
subsequently incorporated a corporation in Israel and transferred his
investment to the Israeli corporation, with the goal of making the
investment eligible for protection under the Czech-Israel BIT. As an
Israeli firm, that investor launched a claim against the Czech
Republic. A denial of benefits provision that contained a substantial
"business activity in Israel" requirement could have been used to
deny the benefits of the treaty to the investor.
What can be glanced from the above is that some cases have
interpreted the denial of benefits provision to require that a state
must give notice of a denial of benefits before a claim is filed.
Whether this is a requirement will depend on how the "Denial of
Benefits" provision is drafted.
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 404 (2009) (delineating the four elements of the
Salini test for defining the term investment: (1) "contributions," (2) "duration of performance of
the contract," (3) "participation in the risks of the transaction," and (4) "contribution to the
economic development of the host State").
228. "At the same time, the ACIA abandons many of the problematic aspects of the 1987
ASEAN IGA. The ACIA definitions of 'investments' and 'covered investors' are consistent
with the broader definitions for such terms under the U.S. and German Model Bilateral
Investment Treaties. The ACIA no longer follows the 1987 ASEAN IGA's strict definition of
an investor company as a 'corporation, partnership or other business association, incorporated
or constituted under the laws in force in the territory of any Contracting Party wherein the place
of effective management is situated.' Instead, the ACIA transposes the element of management
or business operations in its denial of benefits clause, which is worded similarly to the denial of
benefits clause under Article 17 of the Energy Charter Treaty." Diane A. Desierto, ASEANS
Constitutionalization Of International La i:" Challenges To Evolution Under The Ne if Asean
Charter, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 268,308 (2011).
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has identified eight investment awards that openly
deal with the issue of treaty shopping. It is a perfectly legitimate goal,
and no abuse of an investment protection treaty regime, for an
investor to seek to protect itself from the general risk of future
disputes with a host State; 29 but the same is not the case in relation to
pre-existing disputes between the specific investor and the State.
There is no abuse of rights in restructuring an investment to obtain
BIT protection however, for preexisting disputes, to restructure
investments only in order to gain jurisdiction under a BIT would, in
the words of Phoenix Action, be an "abusive manipulation of the
system").)31 Also, compared to the more than three hundred awards
rendered so far by international Tribunal, the quantitative analysis
shows that treaty shopping is not a massive practice which would
currently distorts the very reason of being of investment treaties and
investment arbitration.
However, one must also assume that a number of Awards has
not openly discuss the issue of treaty shopping while, perhaps, the
practice may increase as indicated by the recent attempts of Philip
Morris against Australia. It is true that the investment regime is now
better known of lawyers and combined to the expansion of foreign
investment throughout the world, one can reasonably hypothesize the
increase of treaty shopping. This risk is tangible in light of the great
variety of investment treaties and the different approaches chosen to
determine the scope of some substantive rights. In other words, the
absence of a multilateral agreement on investment further feeds the
risk of treaty shopping. While the risk of treaty shopping is
increasingly high, the Article pointed out at some legal solutions in
the form of narrower definitions of investor and investment and/or
stricter regimes on the admission and legality of the foreign
229. Phoenix Action v. Czech Republic notes that investments can be structured "upstream"
to avail themselves of international protection as confirmed in Tokios Tokeles. Phoenix Action,
Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 94.
230. Tidewater Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5,
Decision on Jurisdiction, 184 (Feb. 8, 2013).
231. Venezuela Holding B. V, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction,
198, 205.
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investment. These solutions can also be combined to a clause on the
denial of benefits which however remain largely untested before
international tribunals. Implicitly, this Article also concludes that the
Contracting Parties to a BIT are free to define their consent to
jurisdiction in terms that are broad or narrow; once that consent is
defined, tribunals should give effect to it, unless doing so would allow
the ICSID Convention to be used for purposes for which it clearly
was not intended. 3z
232. Tokios Tokeles, ICSID Case No. ARB/(/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, II 39-40, 20
ICSID Rev. 205.
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